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Introduction	  On	  March	  2,	  2017,	  Charles	  Murray	  was	  scheduled	  to	  give	  a	  public	  lecture	  at	  Middlebury	  College	  in	  Vermont.	  Murray	  is	  the	  co-­‐author	  of	  the	  highly	  controversial	  1994	  book,	  The	  Bell	  Curve,	  which	  suggested	  that	  class	  divisions	  were	  determined	  significantly	  by	  intelligence,	  and	  that,	  moreover,	  intelligence	  itself	  was	  tied	  to	  race.1	  Because	  of	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  Murray	  has	  been	  accused	  of	  promoting	  a	  racist	  ideology,	  although	  he	  has	  denied	  that	  his	  text	  does	  this,	  and	  argues	  that	  race	  is	  not	  even	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  book.2	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  regardless	  of	  what	  Murray	  
intended,	  the	  connections	  that	  he	  drew	  are	  easily	  adapted,	  with	  little	  inherent	  change,	  for	  use	  in	  arguments	  that	  race	  is	  a	  legitimate	  decider	  of	  social	  status.	  A	  group	  on	  campus	  called	  the	  American	  Enterprise	  Institute	  Club	  invited	  Murray	  to	  discuss	  not	  The	  Bell	  Curve,	  but	  his	  more	  recent	  book,	  Coming	  Apart.3	  Still,	  given	  the	  context	  of	  his	  polemical	  body	  of	  work,	  Murray’s	  arrival	  to	  Middlebury	  disturbed	  and	  enraged	  many	  students,	  who	  argued	  that	  a	  man	  who	  has	  in	  fact	  been	  labeled	  a	  white	  nationalist	  by	  the	  Southern	  Poverty	  Law	  Center,	  should	  not	  be	  given	  a	  platform	  at	  an	  institution	  like	  theirs.4	  To	  express	  their	  dissent,	  students,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  professors	  and	  community	  members,	  organized	  a	  protest	  of	  Murray’s	  talk,	  which	  included	  turning	  their	  backs	  and	  collectively	  reciting	  a	  prepared	  speech	  of	  
                                                1	  Richard	  J.	  Hernstein	  and	  Charles	  A.	  Murray,	  The	  Bell	  Curve:	  Intelligence	  and	  Class	  Structure	  in	  
American	  Life	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1994).	  2	  Charles	  A.	  Murray,	  “The	  Real	  ‘Bell	  Curve,’”	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  December	  2,	  1994,	  sec.	  A14.	  3	  Murray,	  Coming	  Apart:	  The	  State	  of	  White	  America,	  1960-­‐2010	  (New	  York:	  Crown	  Forum,	  2013).	  4	  “Charles	  Murray,”	  Extremist	  Files,	  Southern	  Poverty	  Law	  Center,	  accessed	  April	  5,	  2017,	  https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-­‐hate/extremist-­‐files/individual/charles-­‐murray.	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their	  own,	  undermining	  whatever	  power	  could	  have	  been	  afforded	  to	  Murray	  by	  the	  podium.	  	  This	  event	  was	  significant	  for	  several	  reasons,	  not	  least	  of	  all	  because	  what	  began	  as	  a	  peaceful,	  though	  deliberately	  disruptive	  protest	  devolved	  into	  something	  of	  a	  riot.	  After	  waiting	  on	  stage	  for	  over	  twenty	  minutes	  while	  audience	  members	  chanted	  to	  keep	  him	  from	  speaking,	  Murray	  was	  escorted	  to	  an	  alternate	  location,	  where	  his	  talk	  and	  the	  subsequent	  Q&A	  session	  would	  be	  live-­‐streamed.	  At	  that	  time,	  fire	  alarms	  were	  pulled	  so	  that	  even	  this	  privacy	  could	  not	  fully	  protect	  him	  from	  hearing	  his	  objectors.	  When	  the	  event	  was	  concluded,	  Murray	  and	  Professor	  Allison	  Stanger—who	  served	  as	  the	  faculty	  interlocutor—were	  met	  by	  an	  “angry	  mob”	  of	  students	  as	  they	  tried	  to	  leave	  the	  campus.5	  While	  the	  claims	  of	  violence	  done	  to	  Murray,	  Stanger,	  and	  students	  are	  certainly	  worth	  investigation,	  they	  are	  not	  what	  piqued	  my	  interest	  in	  the	  story,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  directly.	  I,	  like	  many	  others	  who	  have	  reported	  on	  the	  Middlebury	  incident,	  am	  drawn	  to	  it	  as	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  a	  relatively	  new	  brand	  of	  liberalism	  that	  advocates	  for	  conscientious	  censorship	  coming	  to	  a	  clash	  with	  an	  older	  tradition	  that	  ardently	  defends	  the	  right	  to	  free	  speech.	  In	  the	  statement	  read	  during	  Murray’s	  stunted	  lecture,	  protesters	  claimed:	  This	  is	  not	  respectful	  discourse,	  or	  a	  debate	  about	  free	  speech.	  These	  are	  not	  ideas	  that	  can	  be	  fairly	  debated,	  it	  is	  not	  “representative”	  of	  the	  other	  side	  to	  give	  a	  platform	  to	  such	  dangerous	  ideologies.	  There	  is	  not	  a	  potential	  for	  an	  equal	  exchange	  of	  ideas.	  We,	  as	  students,	  and	  community	  members,	  cannot	  
                                                5	  Allison	  Stanger,	  “Understanding	  the	  Angry	  Mob	  at	  Middlebury	  That	  Gave	  Me	  a	  Concussion,”	  The	  
New	  York	  Times,	  March	  13,	  2017,	  sec.	  Opinion.	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engage	  fully	  with	  Charles	  Murray,	  while	  he	  is	  known	  for	  readily	  quoting	  himself.	  Because	  of	  that,	  we	  see	  this	  talk	  as	  hate	  speech.6	  	  What	  is	  clear	  in	  this	  statement	  is	  that	  the	  protesters	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  the	  discourse	  that	  they	  were	  entering—the	  discourse	  they	  were	  disrupting—and	  they	  strategically	  framed	  their	  statement	  to	  anticipate	  their	  objectors.	  The	  opening	  claim	  that	  the	  event,	  whatever	  its	  pretensions,	  was	  not	  and	  could	  not	  live	  up	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  free	  speech	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  forestall	  those	  who	  would	  (and	  have)	  argued	  that	  the	  Middlebury	  protest	  was	  actually	  a	  flagrant	  display	  of	  intolerance,	  counterproductive	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  social	  justice	  workers.	  The	  protesters	  insisted	  that	  Murray’s	  talk,	  both	  in	  its	  form—Murray	  figured	  as	  an	  authority,	  given	  institutional	  validation	  from	  the	  podium	  on	  stage—and	  its	  expected	  content—if	  it	  did	  not	  address	  the	  racist	  and	  sexist	  tones	  of	  his	  earlier	  work	  head	  on,	  then	  they	  were	  involved	  at	  least	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  embedded	  in	  his	  ideas—constituted	  hate	  speech.	  His	  talk,	  therefore,	  did	  not	  fall	  within	  the	  category	  of	  free	  speech,	  and	  would	  not	  be	  heard,	  not	  on	  this	  campus.	  The	  obvious	  objection	  is	  that	  hate	  speech,	  which	  is	  conceptually	  impoverished	  because	  of	  an	  indeterminate	  legal	  definition,	  is	  not	  currently	  excluded	  from	  the	  protections	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment.	  That	  is,	  even	  if	  his	  dissenters	  were	  right	  that	  Murray’s	  lecture	  was	  hate	  speech,	  such	  a	  claim,	  on	  its	  own,	  would	  not	  be	  sufficient	  to	  deny	  him	  the	  right	  to	  speak.	  However,	  many	  colleges,	  including	  
                                                6	  “Middlebury	  Students:	  College	  Administrator	  and	  Staff	  Assault	  STudents,	  Endanger	  Lives	  After	  Murray	  Protest,”	  Beyond	  the	  Green:	  Collective	  of	  Middlebury	  Voices,	  last	  modified	  March	  4,	  2017,	  https://beyondthegreenmidd.wordpress.com/2017/03/04/middlebury-­‐students-­‐college-­‐administrator-­‐and-­‐staff-­‐assault-­‐students-­‐endanger-­‐lives-­‐after-­‐murray-­‐protest/,	  accessed	  April	  5,	  2017.	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Middlebury,	  do	  have	  policies	  that	  restrict	  speech	  as	  part	  of	  their	  codes	  of	  conduct.	  With	  certain	  variations,	  such	  policies,	  aimed	  at	  curbing	  harassment	  and	  discrimination,	  prohibit	  verbal,	  written,	  or	  physical	  conduct	  motivated	  by	  a	  person’s	  actual	  or	  perceived	  race,	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  nationality,	  age,	  disability,	  or	  other	  characteristics	  as	  defined	  and	  protected	  by	  law.	  On	  these	  grounds,	  if	  Murray’s	  talk	  “undermin[ed]	  or	  detract[ed]	  from	  ...	  an	  individual’s	  educational	  work	  or	  performance,”	  or	  “creat[ed]	  an	  intimidating,	  hostile,	  or	  offensive	  educational,	  work,	  or	  living	  environment,”	  it	  could	  fall	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  prohibited	  speech	  on	  the	  campus.7	  	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  Murray	  hardly	  uttered	  a	  full	  sentence	  on	  stage	  before	  protesters	  rejected	  his	  lecture.	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  many	  audience-­‐members	  anticipated	  Murray’s	  speech	  to	  be	  deeply	  offensive—undermining	  of	  the	  academic	  efforts	  and	  broader	  social	  lives	  of	  people	  of	  color,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  contributive	  to	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  hostility	  toward	  those	  individuals—it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  speech	  would	  necessarily	  have	  that	  effect.	  Protesters	  seemed	  to	  be	  pointing	  more	  to	  the	  symbolic	  power	  of	  Murray’s	  presence	  when	  they	  denounced	  the	  talk	  as	  hate	  speech,	  rather	  than	  its	  actual	  content.	  This	  reveals	  the	  dilemma	  of	  policies	  that	  prohibit	  certain	  speech,	  such	  as	  those	  found	  in	  the	  codes	  of	  conduct	  of	  many	  colleges.	  The	  negative	  imperative	  implicit	  in	  such	  policy—don’t	  use	  that	  word,	  don’t	  make	  that	  argument,	  etc.—is	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  the	  speech	  it	  tries	  to	  eradicate	  is	  not	  only	  offensive,	  but	  also	  perpetuates	  the	  unjust	  systems	  of	  oppression	  targeted	  
                                                7	  “Anti-­‐Harassment/Discrimination	  Policy,”	  in	  Middlebury	  College	  Handbook,	  Middlebury	  College,	  2017.	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against	  certain	  groups	  of	  people.	  Written	  into	  the	  language,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  a	  history	  of	  violence	  and	  exclusion	  that	  has	  kept	  minority	  groups	  subordinate	  to	  a	  largely	  white,	  heterosexual,	  and	  male	  power.	  Such	  dominance	  might	  be	  unwritten,	  according	  to	  this	  logic,	  if	  the	  language	  that	  propagates	  it	  is	  unarticulated.	  However,	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  must	  not	  only	  police	  our	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  seems	  antithetical	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  free	  speech	  that	  is	  so	  foundational	  to	  this	  country,	  but	  we	  must	  also	  immobilize	  language	  in	  a	  way	  that	  severely	  reduces	  its	  power	  of	  signification.	  That	  is,	  in	  censoring	  what	  is	  preemptively	  defined	  as	  hate	  speech,	  we	  diminish	  the	  possibility	  of	  that	  language	  to	  become	  anything	  other	  than	  hate	  speech.	  At	  the	  center	  of	  this	  debate	  is	  a	  question	  of	  how	  meaning	  operates	  in	  language,	  and	  the	  political	  and	  ethical	  consequences	  thereof.	  Although	  they	  have	  not	  always	  involved	  these	  latter	  considerations	  explicitly,	  philosophers	  have	  long	  deliberated	  over	  the	  origins	  and	  structures	  of	  meaning	  in	  ways	  that	  could	  prove	  to	  be	  valuable	  contributions	  to	  the	  current	  discourse.	  One	  such	  figure	  is	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein	  (1889-­‐1951),	  whose	  idiosyncratic	  philosophy	  of	  language	  offered	  a	  radical	  reimagination	  of	  semantic	  mechanics.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  idealization	  of	  meaning	  embedded	  within	  the	  reigning	  logical	  positivism	  of	  his	  contemporaries,	  Wittgenstein	  argued	  that	  language	  was	  essentially	  an	  activity,	  a	  form	  of	  life,	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  was	  to	  be	  found	  in	  its	  use.	  This	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory	  is	  part	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  holism,	  which	  rejects	  dualist	  idealism,	  and	  aims	  at	  freeing	  those	  mired	  by	  philosophical	  conundrums	  by	  revealing	  how	  they	  can	  be	  dissolved	  through	  proper	  grammatical	  analysis.	  In	  this	  way,	  Wittgenstein’s	  work	  anticipates	  that	  of	  Jacques	  Derrida	  (1930-­‐2004),	  whose	  innovative	  method	  of	  deconstruction	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was	  aimed	  at	  dismantling	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  absurd	  hierarchies	  plaguing	  traditional	  philosophy.	  	  I	  see	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  of	  language,	  which	  is	  really	  a	  philosophy	  of	  life,	  as	  a	  proto-­‐deconstruction	  of	  meaning	  and	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  working	  through	  the	  problem	  of	  censoring	  hate	  speech.	  The	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory	  dislocates	  the	  power	  of	  the	  word	  from	  the	  object	  or	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  said	  to	  represent,	  and	  situates	  it,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  in	  the	  negotiation	  of	  the	  word’s	  relationship	  with	  other	  signs.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word,	  its	  efficacy	  in	  language,	  cannot	  be	  absolutely	  fixed	  without	  presupposing	  an	  incongruous	  logic	  of	  language	  (and	  life).	  This	  logic	  is	  not	  only	  erroneous,	  but	  dangerous;	  in	  the	  attempt	  to	  defang	  language	  by	  excising	  the	  hate	  from	  it,	  we	  also	  disarm	  ourselves	  of	  the	  tools	  necessary	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  more	  just	  world.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  Wittgensteinian	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory	  is	  the	  right	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  how	  language	  operates,	  not	  only	  in	  the	  way	  it	  figures	  the	  structure	  of	  language,	  but	  also	  insofar	  as	  it	  leads	  us	  out	  of	  the	  quandary	  of	  ethically	  treating	  language.	  Wittgenstein’s	  deconstruction	  of	  meaning	  reveals	  what	  Derrida	  would	  later	  call	  the	  necessary	  ambivalence	  of	  the	  word,	  which	  calls	  for	  an	  ethics	  of	  openness	  to	  precisely	  that	  ambivalence.	  It	  is	  in	  that	  ambivalence	  that	  evil	  is	  rooted,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  from	  that	  ambivalence	  that	  the	  good	  emerges.	  I	  begin	  my	  argument	  with	  a	  critical	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus	  
Logico-­‐Philosophicus.8	  I	  follow	  resolute	  readers	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  such	  as	  such	  as	  Cora	  
                                                8	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus	  Logico	  Philosophicus,	  trans.	  C.K.	  Ogden	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2005).	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Diamond	  and	  Michael	  Kremer,	  and	  thus	  read	  the	  Tractatus	  as	  establishing	  the	  structure	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  philosophy,	  and	  not	  something	  that	  he	  wholly	  rejected.	  Consequently,	  understanding	  the	  proffered	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  language	  and	  the	  conception	  of	  meaning	  that	  follows	  from	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  essential	  to	  understanding	  the	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory	  of	  the	  later	  Philosophical	  Investigations.9	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  Tractatus,	  in	  its	  aim	  of	  delimiting	  the	  bounds	  of	  sensical	  language,	  implies	  a	  framework	  for	  grasping	  the	  ethical	  function	  of	  language.	  That	  is,	  in	  distinguishing	  what	  language	  says	  from	  what	  it	  shows,	  Wittgenstein	  points	  to	  a	  major	  source	  of	  the	  philosophical	  confusion	  regarding	  the	  function	  of	  language	  in	  our	  lives.	  	  It	  is	  this	  thread	  that	  motivates	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  Investigations,	  which,	  by	  meandering	  through	  a	  series	  of	  linguistic	  scenes,	  aims	  to	  clarify	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world.	  In	  the	  second	  chapter,	  I	  provide	  an	  exegesis	  of	  the	  
Investigations,	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  how	  the	  text,	  in	  both	  its	  form	  and	  content,	  is	  a	  deconstruction	  of	  traditional	  conceptions	  of	  meaning,	  a	  move	  which	  was	  rooted	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  but	  could	  only	  be	  brought	  out	  through	  the	  idiosyncratic	  style	  of	  the	  
Investigations.	  Insofar	  as	  Wittgenstein	  produces	  a	  theory	  of	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use,	  I	  argue,	  he	  also	  figures	  language	  as	  a	  form	  of	  life,	  which	  dissolves	  the	  metaphysical	  idealism	  of	  linguistic	  meaning.	  The	  third	  chapter	  aims	  at	  drawing	  out	  the	  full	  force	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  argument.	  I	  explore	  it	  through	  the	  lense	  of	  the	  famous	  private	  language	  argument,	  
                                                9	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein,	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  4th	  ed.	  (Chichester,	  West	  Sussex:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  2010).	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Chapter	  1:	  the	  Sense	  in	  the	  Senseless	  It	  may	  seem	  strange	  to	  approach	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  censorship	  of	  hate	  speech	  by	  looking	  back	  to	  the	  inspiration	  of	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	  whose	  preoccupation	  with	  logic	  and	  science	  seemed	  to	  remove	  them	  from	  political	  discourse	  regarding	  value	  and	  ethics.	  That	  group	  was	  the	  Vienna	  Circle—formed	  in	  the	  early	  1920s	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Moritz	  Schlick—and	  they	  took	  as	  their	  manifesto	  the	  work	  of	  a	  young	  philosopher	  named	  Ludwig	  Wittgenstein.	  The	  Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  was	  the	  first	  published	  work	  by	  this	  new	  figure	  on	  the	  scene,	  who	  had	  been	  a	  student	  of	  famed	  logician	  Bertrand	  Russell.	  It	  read	  to	  the	  Circle	  as	  a	  beautiful	  systematization	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  language,	  and	  provided	  a	  methodology	  for	  dispelling	  philosophical	  problems	  through	  the	  clarified	  understanding	  of	  this	  logic.	  This	  involved	  the	  narrowing	  of	  philosophical	  concerns	  to	  the	  spheres	  of	  science	  and	  mathematics—which	  could	  be	  analyzed	  through	  a	  strictly	  logical	  framework—and	  seemed	  to	  set	  aside	  the	  question	  of	  value	  as	  incidental	  and	  prone	  to	  causing	  misunderstanding.10	  In	  this	  light,	  we	  may	  reasonably	  be	  led	  to	  think	  of	  Wittgenstein	  as	  a	  logical	  positivist,	  and	  thus	  unlikely	  to	  have	  much	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  ethics.	  	  	   But	  this	  would	  be	  a	  short-­‐sighted	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein.	  Although	  his	  early	  work	  did	  indeed	  capture	  the	  attention	  of	  eminent	  positivist	  thinkers,	  Wittgenstein	  fought	  to	  distance	  himself	  from	  this	  position.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Ludwig	  von	  Ficker,	  he	  wrote	  that	  his	  purpose	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  was	  essentially	  ethical,	  though	  it	  could	  not	  have	  been	  explicitly	  so.	  As	  he	  claimed:	  
                                                10	  See	  Brian	  McGuinness,	  “Wittgenstein	  and	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,”	  Synthese	  64,	  no.	  3	  (1985):	  351–58.	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I	  once	  meant	  to	  include	  in	  the	  preface	  a	  sentence	  which	  is	  not	  in	  fact	  there	  now,	  but	  which	  I	  will	  write	  out	  for	  you	  here,	  because	  it	  will	  perhaps	  be	  a	  key	  for	  you.	  What	  I	  meant	  to	  write	  then	  was	  this:	  my	  work	  consists	  of	  two	  parts:	  the	  one	  presented	  here	  plus	  all	  that	  I	  have	  not	  written.	  And	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  second	  part	  that	  is	  the	  important	  one.	  For	  the	  ethical	  gets	  its	  limit	  drawn	  from	  the	  inside,	  as	  it	  were,	  by	  my	  book;	  and	  I	  am	  convinced	  that	  this	  is	  the	  ONLY	  rigorous	  way	  of	  drawing	  that	  limit.11	  	  As	  readers	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  we	  should	  take	  Wittgenstein	  at	  his	  word	  here,	  and	  try	  to	  identify	  what	  the	  ethical	  point	  of	  the	  text	  is.	  In	  doing	  this,	  I	  think	  we	  will	  not	  only	  understand	  Wittgenstein	  more	  accurately,	  but	  also	  find	  the	  groundwork	  for	  reading	  his	  philosophy	  of	  language	  as	  a	  way	  out	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  censoring	  hate	  speech.	  Let	  us	  begin,	  then,	  by	  trying	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  Tractatus	  says.	  	   In	  the	  Preface	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  Wittgenstein	  makes	  his	  aims	  for	  the	  text	  quite	  explicit.	  By	  way	  of	  providing	  a	  sort	  of	  preliminary	  thesis,	  he	  writes:	  	  The	  book	  deals	  with	  the	  problems	  of	  philosophy	  and	  shows,	  as	  I	  believe,	  that	  the	  method	  of	  formulating	  these	  problems	  rests	  on	  the	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  our	  language.	  Its	  whole	  meaning	  could	  be	  summed	  up	  somewhat	  as	  follows:	  What	  can	  be	  said	  at	  all	  can	  be	  said	  clearly;	  and	  whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak	  thereof	  one	  must	  be	  silent.12	  	  And	  he	  goes	  on	  to	  provide	  his	  methodology:	  The	  book	  will,	  therefore,	  draw	  a	  limit	  to	  thinking,	  or	  rather—not	  to	  thinking,	  but	  to	  the	  expression	  of	  thoughts;	  for,	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  a	  limit	  to	  thinking	  we	  should	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  think	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  limit	  (we	  should	  therefore	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  think	  what	  cannot	  be	  thought).	  The	  limit,	  therefore,	  can	  only	  be	  drawn	  in	  language	  and	  what	  lies	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  limit	  will	  be	  simply	  nonsense.13	  	  	  From	  these	  opening	  lines,	  it	  would	  not	  seem	  unreasonable	  for	  the	  reader	  to	  expect	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  precisely	  what	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  made	  of	  it:	  an	  articulation	  of	  the	  
                                                11	  Quoted	  in	  Cora	  Diamond,	  “Ethics,	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Method	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus,”	  in	  The	  
New	  Wittgenstein,	  eds.	  Alice	  Crary	  and	  Rupert	  Read	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  149–73.	  12	  Wittgenstein,	  preface	  to	  Tractatus,	  27.	  13	  Ibid.	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logical	  structure	  of	  language.	  And	  indeed,	  as	  we	  dive	  into	  the	  text,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  it	  does.	  With	  great	  prowess,	  Wittgenstein	  takes	  a	  scrupulously	  analytic	  approach	  to	  the	  deepest	  philosophical	  questions,	  from	  metaphysics	  to	  epistemology	  to	  ethics,	  all	  the	  while	  showing	  how	  the	  apparent	  problems	  within	  these	  subjects	  can	  be	  dissolved	  through	  a	  logical	  analysis	  of	  their	  linguistic	  expression.	  All	  of	  these	  philosophical	  puzzles,	  Wittgenstein	  argues,	  come	  down	  to	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  our	  language,	  confusions	  arising	  from	  the	  grammar.	  Therefore,	  a	  clarified	  sense	  of	  the	  logic	  will	  lead	  to	  the	  demystification	  of	  thought.	  So	  what	  exactly	  is	  this	  logic	  of	  language?	  In	  the	  Tractatus,	  Wittgenstein	  presents	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  meaning,	  so	  called	  because	  it	  figures	  language	  as	  our	  means	  of	  “mak[ing]	  to	  ourselves	  pictures	  of	  facts.”14	  The	  world,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  is	  “the	  totality	  of	  facts,	  not	  of	  things,”	  and	  as	  these	  facts	  relate	  to	  one	  another	  according	  to	  a	  definite	  and	  exhaustive	  possibility,	  they	  stand	  in	  logical	  space.15	  Within	  this	  realm,	  there	  is	  no	  accident,	  only	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  the	  object.	  That	  is,	  the	  world	  as	  a	  totality	  of	  facts	  is	  one	  that	  encompasses	  and	  accords	  with	  all	  logical	  possibility,	  and	  therefore	  involves	  a	  certain	  form.	  	   It	  is	  by	  following	  this	  form,	  Wittgenstein	  might	  say,	  that	  “[we]	  make	  to	  ourselves	  pictures	  of	  facts.”16	  Or	  rather,	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  share	  a	  logical	  form	  that	  we	  can	  make	  a	  picture	  of	  fact.	  As	  he	  writes:	  
                                                14	  Ibid.,	  §2.1	  15	  Ibid.,	  §1.1	  16	  Ibid.,	  §2.1	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2.17	   What	  the	  picture	  must	  have	  in	  common	  with	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  it	  after	  its	  manner—rightly	  or	  falsely—is	  its	  form	  of	  representation.	  	  2.18	   What	  every	  picture,	  of	  whatever	  form,	  must	  have	  in	  common	  with	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  it	  at	  all—rightly	  or	  falsely—is	  the	  logical	  form,	  that	  is,	  the	  form	  of	  reality.	  	  This	  point	  is	  extraordinary.	  The	  transformation	  from	  the	  first	  iteration	  of	  this	  proposition	  to	  the	  second	  is,	  for	  one,	  indicative	  of	  the	  surprising	  subtlety	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  style.	  The	  rigid,	  axiomatic	  method	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  easily	  to	  any	  substantial	  formal	  analysis,	  in	  the	  literary	  sense,	  yet	  we	  are	  here	  treated	  to	  a	  taste	  of	  the	  wonderful	  idiosyncrasy	  that	  is	  Wittgenstein.	  His	  careful	  employment	  of	  a	  parallel	  syntax	  in	  the	  two	  propositions	  adds	  drama,	  for	  one,	  to	  the	  
Tractatus,	  and,	  perhaps	  inadvertently,	  reminds	  the	  reader	  of	  the	  very	  human	  hand	  behind	  the	  text,	  an	  important	  point	  that	  will	  be	  elaborated	  on	  later.	  But,	  more	  straightforwardly,	  it	  shows	  that	  the	  most	  basic,	  most	  fundamental	  commonality	  between	  the	  picture	  and	  the	  pictured	  is	  the	  logical	  form.	  This	  is	  the	  key	  fact	  about	  language	  that	  makes	  it	  possible	  for	  it	  to	  have	  a	  sense,	  for	  us	  to	  be	  able	  to	  say	  anything	  with	  it	  about	  the	  world.	  	   It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  why	  this	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  meaning	  would	  be	  attractive	  to	  the	  logical	  positivists	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle.	  The	  picture	  that	  Wittgenstein	  posits	  we	  make	  to	  ourselves	  is	  our	  thought.	  “The	  logical	  picture	  of	  the	  facts	  is	  the	  thought.”17	  Because	  thought	  shares	  the	  logical	  form	  of	  the	  facts	  of	  reality,	  the	  two	  are	  logically	  linked;	  the	  picture	  “reaches	  up	  to	  [reality]”	  to	  model	  it,	  and	  it	  thus	  becomes	  possible	  to	  make	  meaning	  of	  it,	  to	  express	  it	  with	  sense.	  Of	  course,	  whether	  
                                                17	  Ibid.,	  §3	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or	  not	  we	  make	  the	  right	  meaning,	  that	  is,	  whether	  or	  not	  what	  we	  say	  of	  the	  world	  is	  true	  depends	  on	  if	  the	  picture	  we	  have	  made	  is	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  world.	  Thus,	  positivists	  attracted	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus	  could	  read	  it	  as	  comporting	  well	  with	  their	  notion	  that	  rigorous	  scientific	  analysis	  could	  reveal	  the	  truths	  of	  the	  world.	  	  	   I	  have	  already	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  I	  take	  it	  the	  purely	  positivistic	  reading	  of	  the	  
Tractatus	  is	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  it,	  but	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  why	  this	  is,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  work	  through	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning	  that	  the	  Tractatus	  puts	  forth.	  And	  while	  I	  think	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  distinguish	  Wittgenstein	  from	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  given	  that	  meaning	  is	  the	  central	  point	  of	  inquiry	  throughout	  this	  entire	  project,	  understanding	  Wittgenstein’s	  picture-­‐theory	  is	  a	  vital	  task	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  addressing	  the	  ethical	  question	  more	  broadly.	  	   After	  establishing	  the	  logical	  relationship	  between	  the	  world	  and	  thought,	  Wittgenstein	  dives	  into	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  meaningful	  language	  through	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  proposition.	  He	  writes:	  3.1	   In	  the	  proposition	  the	  thought	  is	  expressed	  perceptibly	  through	  the	  senses.	  	  3.12	   The	  sign	  through	  which	  we	  express	  the	  thought	  I	  call	  the	  propositional	  sign.	  And	  the	  proposition	  is	  the	  propositional	  sign	  in	  its	  projective	  relation	  to	  the	  world.	  	  This	  relatively	  straightforward	  definition	  of	  the	  proposition	  positions	  language	  as	  the	  means	  by	  which	  thought	  is	  articulated	  in	  the	  world.	  In	  keeping	  with	  the	  picture	  metaphor,	  we	  might	  think	  of	  language	  as	  the	  pen	  with	  which	  the	  doodler	  commits	  her	  imagination	  to	  the	  paper	  during	  class.	  Of	  course,	  language	  is	  an	  arguably	  more	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adept	  form	  of	  expression	  of	  thought	  than	  any	  spatial	  representation;	  the	  point,	  here,	  being	  simply	  that	  the	  proposition	  projects	  the	  thought	  into	  the	  world.	  	   But	  the	  significance	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  picture-­‐theory	  is	  not	  merely	  in	  its	  treatment	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  language	  and	  the	  world,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  meaning	  within	  language.	  Wittgenstein	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  proposition	  itself	  does	  not	  contain	  the	  sense,	  but	  “the	  possibility	  of	  expressing	  it.”18	  That	  is,	  the	  proposition	  is	  the	  form	  through	  which	  meaning	  may	  be	  conveyed,	  though	  this	  meaning	  is	  not	  determined	  prior	  to	  its	  expression.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  proposition	  is	  supplied	  by	  way	  of	  the	  relations	  of	  the	  words	  with	  each	  other,	  and	  thus	  cannot	  be	  given	  except	  in	  the	  proposition.	  To	  understand	  this	  point,	  recall	  that	  the	  simplest	  element	  of	  the	  world,	  an	  atomic	  fact,	  is	  itself	  a	  relation	  between	  at	  least	  two	  things.	  Or,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  puts	  it,	  “[an]	  atomic	  fact	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  objects	  (entities,	  things).”19	  Things	  alone	  cannot	  be	  facts,	  because	  taken	  in	  absolute	  isolation	  there	  is	  nothing	  significant	  about	  them.	  Likewise,	  to	  name	  an	  object	  is	  to	  point	  to	  an	  object,	  in	  a	  way,	  but	  in	  so	  doing,	  nothing	  significant	  is	  said	  about	  the	  object.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  most	  basic	  proposition	  must	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  this	  relation,	  and	  more	  complex	  propositions	  must	  express	  more	  complex	  relations.	  Thus,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  3.3	   Only	  the	  proposition	  has	  sense;	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  proposition	  has	  a	  name	  meaning.	  	  We	  might	  say,	  then,	  that	  meaning,	  on	  the	  Tractarian	  account,	  is	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  thing	  to	  which	  the	  proposition	  points,	  a	  significance	  that	  determined	  by	  its	  
                                                18	  Ibid.,	  §3.13	  19	  Ibid.,	  §2.01	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relation	  to	  other	  things,	  and	  made	  apparent	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  proposition.	  By	  locating	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  proposition	  in	  the	  relations	  among	  its	  constitutive	  elements,	  we	  already	  see	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  the	  forerunner	  to	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  that	  Wittgenstein	  develops	  in	  his	  later	  work.	  	  	   That	  meaning	  is	  already	  figured	  as	  operating	  according	  to	  its	  use	  in	  the	  
Tractatus	  is	  perhaps	  the	  first	  hint	  that	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  had	  misread	  the	  text.	  The	  positivist	  reading	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  reducing	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  revision	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  predecessor,	  Bertrand	  Russell.	  In	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Logical	  Atomism,	  published	  just	  four	  years	  prior	  to	  the	  Tractatus,	  Russell	  wrote:	  In	  a	  logically	  perfect	  language	  the	  words	  in	  a	  proposition	  would	  correspond	  one	  by	  one	  with	  the	  components	  of	  the	  corresponding	  fact,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  such	  words	  as	  ‘or,’	  ‘not,’	  ‘if,’	  ‘then,’	  which	  have	  a	  different	  function.	  In	  a	  logically	  perfect	  language,	  there	  will	  be	  one	  word	  and	  no	  more	  for	  every	  simple	  object,	  and	  everything	  that	  is	  not	  simple	  will	  be	  expressed	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  words,	  by	  a	  combination	  derived,	  of	  course,	  from	  the	  words	  for	  the	  simple	  things	  that	  enter	  in,	  one	  word	  for	  each	  simple	  component.	  A	  language	  of	  that	  sort	  will	  be	  completely	  analytic,	  and	  will	  show	  at	  a	  glance	  the	  logical	  structure	  of	  the	  facts	  asserted	  or	  denied.20	  	  	  Though	  Russell	  dreamed	  of	  this	  language,	  he	  realized	  it	  was	  not	  feasible.	  He	  was	  quick	  to	  make	  it	  explicitly	  clear	  that	  he	  did	  not	  believe	  such	  a	  language	  was	  possible	  or	  even	  worthwhile	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  human	  communication.	  He	  therefore	  qualified	  his	  advocacy	  of	  a	  logically	  perfect	  language	  with	  the	  following:	  Actual	  languages	  are	  not	  logically	  perfect	  in	  this	  sense,	  and	  they	  cannot	  possibly	  be,	  if	  they	  are	  to	  serve	  the	  purposes	  of	  daily	  life.	  A	  logically	  perfect	  language,	  if	  it	  could	  be	  constructed,	  would	  not	  only	  be	  intolerably	  prolix,	  but,	  as	  regards	  its	  vocabulary,	  would	  be	  very	  largely	  private	  to	  one	  speaker.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  all	  the	  names	  that	  it	  would	  use	  would	  be	  private	  to	  that	  speaker	  and	  
                                                20	  Bertrand	  Russell,	  “Logical	  Atomism,”	  in	  The	  Philosophy	  of	  Logical	  Atomism	  (La	  Salle,	  Illinois:	  Open	  Court,	  1985),	  p.	  58.	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could	  not	  enter	  into	  the	  language	  of	  another	  speaker.	  …	  Altogether	  you	  would	  find	  that	  it	  would	  be	  a	  very	  inconvenient	  language	  indeed.21	  	  Wittgenstein’s	  great	  departure	  from	  Russell,	  which	  can	  read	  even	  through	  a	  positivist	  view—which	  is	  in	  fact	  necessary	  to	  the	  positivist	  view—is	  that	  language	  as	  it	  stands	  is	  already	  logically	  perfect,	  or	  at	  the	  very	  least	  bears	  the	  possibility	  of	  perfectly	  logical	  expression	  already	  in	  it.	  However,	  in	  taking	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  be	  offering	  only	  a	  way	  by	  which	  Russell’s	  dream	  can	  be	  achieved,	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  sells	  the	  text	  short.	  	  	   We	  may	  recall	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  wrote	  in	  the	  Preface,	  is	  to	  delimit	  what	  can	  be	  expressed	  in	  language.	  What	  may	  be	  the	  most	  significant	  consequence	  of	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  meaning,	  therefore,	  is	  precisely	  that	  it	  draws	  that	  line	  between	  what	  can	  and	  cannot	  be	  said.	  The	  limit	  of	  language,	  according	  to	  the	  picture-­‐theory,	  is	  set	  at	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  language.	  That	  is,	  in	  figuring	  language	  as	  a	  picture,	  and	  moreover	  a	  picture	  of	  logical	  relations,	  Wittgenstein	  argues	  that	  there	  can	  be	  no	  meta-­‐language	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  logic,	  because	  language	  must	  always	  be	  made	  sense	  of	  within	  the	  logic.	  However,	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  picture,	  language	  is	  able	  to	  show	  the	  logical	  relations.	  Thus,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  4.022	   The	  proposition	  shows	  its	  sense.	  	   The	  proposition	  shows	  how	  things	  stand,	  if	  it	  is	  true.	  And	  it	  says,	  that	  they	  do	  stand.	  	  4.121	   Propositions	  cannot	  represent	  the	  logical	  form:	  this	  mirrors	  itself	  in	  the	  propositions.	  That	  which	  mirrors	  itself	  in	  language,	  language	  cannot	  represent.	  
                                                21	  Ibid.,	  59	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That	  which	  expresses	  itself	  in	  language,	  we	  cannot	  express	  by	  language.	  The	  propositions	  show	  the	  logical	  form	  of	  reality.	  They	  exhibit	  it.	  	  The	  logic	  of	  language,	  simply	  put,	  can	  be	  shown,	  but	  not	  said.	  If	  we	  take	  seriously	  the	  implication	  that	  logic	  is,	  in	  a	  way,	  ineffable,	  then	  we	  must	  come	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  all	  that	  the	  Tractatus	  has	  been	  trying	  to	  tell	  us	  must	  be	  strictly	  senseless.	  And	  indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	  reaches,	  declaring	  in	  the	  penultimate	  proposition:	  	  6.54	   My	  propositions	  are	  elucidatory	  in	  this	  way:	  he	  who	  understands	  me	  finally	  recognizes	  them	  as	  senseless,	  when	  he	  has	  climbed	  through	  them,	  on	  them,	  over	  them.	  (He	  must	  so	  to	  speak	  throw	  away	  the	  ladder,	  after	  he	  has	  climbed	  up	  on	  it.)	  	   He	  must	  surmount	  these	  propositions;	  then	  he	  sees	  the	  world	  rightly.	  	  By	  trying	  to	  articulate	  the	  logic	  of	  language,	  Wittgenstein	  has	  apparently	  been	  engaging	  in	  the	  impossible	  task	  of	  putting	  into	  words	  that	  which	  is	  unspeakable.	  How	  could	  Wittgenstein	  so	  blatantly	  undermine	  his	  own	  work?	  Or,	  as	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  Wittgenstein	  did	  so	  with	  full	  self-­‐awareness,	  why	  would	  he	  write	  such	  senselessness?	  Wittgenstein	  has	  already	  provided	  an	  answer	  to	  this	  question,	  although	  we	  may	  have	  previously	  overlooked	  it.	  With	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  subtlety,	  he	  directs	  us	  to	  it	  in	  his	  final	  proposition:	  7	   Whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak,	  thereof	  one	  must	  be	  silent.	  	  This	  elegant	  conclusion	  is	  an	  echo	  of	  the	  claim	  made	  in	  the	  Preface,	  and	  the	  astute	  reader	  should	  therefore	  go	  back	  to	  the	  beginning	  to	  understand	  the	  full	  implications	  of	  this	  connection.	  In	  the	  Preface,	  we	  will	  recall,	  Wittgenstein	  declared,	  “[the]	  book	  
 	  
20	  
…	  shows,	  as	  I	  believe	  that	  the	  method	  of	  formulating	  [philosophical]	  problems	  rests	  on	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  our	  language”	  (my	  emphasis).22	  Returning	  to	  this	  with	  knowing	  eyes,	  we	  can	  see	  now	  that	  the	  Preface	  foreshadows	  what	  is	  to	  come	  in	  the	  book,	  shrewdly	  hinting	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  the	  true	  value	  of	  the	  text	  will	  not	  be	  in	  what	  it	  says,	  but	  what	  it	  shows.	  	  	   Cora	  Diamond	  argues	  that	  the	  Preface	  and	  concluding	  propositions	  thus	  constitute	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  which	  disclose	  the	  “aim	  of	  the	  book	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  reading	  it	  requires.”23	  If	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  to	  show	  that	  the	  usual	  approach	  to	  philosophical	  problems	  is	  essentially	  confused,	  its	  method	  is	  to	  take	  this	  conventional	  approach	  to	  its	  logical	  end,	  showing	  that	  it	  must,	  on	  its	  own	  terms,	  be	  senseless.	  According	  to	  Diamond,	  to	  read	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  to	  partake	  in	  “a	  kind	  of	  imaginative	  activity,”	  wherein	  we	  suppose	  that	  the	  propositions	  actually	  do	  have	  a	  sense	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  that	  they	  are	  necessarily	  senseless.24	  The	  Tractatus	  poses	  itself	  as	  a	  ladder,	  to	  use	  Wittgenstein’s	  metaphor,	  leading	  us	  rung	  by	  rung	  out	  of	  the	  depths	  of	  philosophical	  confusion,	  only	  to	  show	  us,	  in	  the	  end,	  that	  we	  have	  always	  been	  standing	  on	  our	  own	  two	  feet.	  We	  therefore	  throw	  away	  the	  ladder.	  This	  is	  a	  revelation,	  and	  as	  such,	  it	  necessarily	  leaves	  the	  reader	  changed.	  Before	  working	  through	  the	  Tractatus,	  we	  were	  under	  the	  impression,	  the	  illusion,	  that	  the	  world	  presented	  to	  us	  all	  kinds	  of	  philosophical	  problems.	  To	  work	  through	  them,	  we	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  right	  sense	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  needed	  to	  
                                                22	  Wittgenstein,	  preface	  to	  Tractatus,	  27.	  23	  Cora	  Diamond,	  “Ethics,	  Imagination	  and	  the	  Method	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus,”	  in	  The	  New	  
Wittgenstein,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  149.	  24	  Ibid.,	  157.	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properly	  understand	  the	  logic	  of	  our	  language.	  Only	  in	  this	  way	  could	  we	  see	  the	  truth	  that	  lay	  hidden	  behind	  our	  questions.	  The	  project	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  our	  language,	  or	  articulating	  its	  logic,	  necessitated	  that	  we	  imagine	  ourselves	  able	  to	  get	  
outside	  language,	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  it.	  Such	  a	  metaphysical	  leap	  was	  impossible,	  senseless.	  But	  recognizing	  the	  absurdity	  of	  this	  effort	  does	  accomplish	  something;	  it	  
reorients	  us	  to	  the	  world	  and	  shows	  us	  that	  in	  it,	  we	  are	  free.	  Michael	  Kremer	  beautifully	  puts	  it	  as	  follows:	  It	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  think	  that	  we	  climb	  “up”	  the	  ladder	  of	  the	  Tractatus’	  propositions	  to	  a	  position	  ‘above’	  the	  world,	  from	  which	  we	  can	  view	  the	  world	  “sub	  specie	  aeterni.”	  Rather	  we	  “climb	  out	  through	  them,	  on	  them,	  over	  them.”	  My	  image	  is	  this:	  we	  are	  in	  a	  pit	  of	  our	  own	  making.	  The	  “ladder”	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  leads	  us	  not	  higher	  and	  higher	  above	  the	  ground,	  but	  out	  of	  the	  pit	  into	  the	  world,	  in	  which	  we	  are	  now	  free	  to	  live.25	  	  The	  positivism	  of	  the	  Vienna	  Circle	  did	  not	  understand	  Wittgenstein	  on	  this	  point.	  Although	  they	  did	  indeed	  turn	  to	  the	  world	  for	  answers,	  their	  philosophical	  attitude	  was	  still	  that	  the	  world	  stood	  in	  need	  of	  explanation,	  of	  justification.	  Endeavors	  of	  this	  type	  would	  always	  be	  misguided,	  because	  they	  attempted	  to	  do	  precisely	  what	  Wittgenstein	  showed	  us	  was	  senseless,	  namely,	  get	  outside	  of	  language.	  	  This	  was	  perhaps	  the	  deepest	  point	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  and	  one	  which	  was	  not,	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  dismay,	  easily	  drawn	  out.	  What	  we	  find	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  aim	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  was	  to	  show	  the	  reader	  a	  way	  of	  living	  well—which	  is	  to	  say,	  philosophically	  untroubled—by	  pointing	  to	  the	  senselessness	  in	  presuming	  that	  philosophical	  problems	  stood	  in	  the	  way.	  The	  Tractatus,	  then,	  is	  profoundly	  ethical.	  Its	  fundamental	  doctrine,	  which	  is	  not	  really	  a	  doctrine	  at	  all,	  is	  the	  remark	  that	  
                                                25	  Michael	  Kremer,	  “The	  Purpose	  of	  Tractarian	  Nonsense,”	  Nous	  35,	  no.	  1	  (2001):	  60.	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opens	  and	  closes	  the	  text,	  “Whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak,	  thereof	  one	  must	  be	  silent.”26	  Though	  phrased	  as	  a	  proscription,	  this	  demand	  is	  impotent	  in	  its	  prohibitive	  power,	  because	  the	  call	  for	  silence	  applies	  only	  in	  cases	  where	  it	  is	  already	  impossible	  to	  speak.	  Wittgenstein	  therefore	  shows	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  limiting	  the	  powers	  of	  our	  language	  to	  that	  which	  is	  sensical	  is	  itself	  senseless.	  As	  Kremer	  writes:	  The	  point	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  as	  I	  see	  it,	  is	  not	  to	  stop	  us	  from	  producing	  nonsense,	  as	  if	  Wittgenstein	  wanted	  to	  eliminate	  the	  Ogden	  Nash’s	  and	  Lewis	  Carroll’s	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  point	  is	  to	  change	  our	  relationship	  to	  nonsense,	  to	  get	  us	  to	  stop	  wanting	  certain	  kinds	  of	  things	  of	  nonsense	  in	  certain	  kinds	  of	  ways	  and	  for	  certain	  kinds	  of	  reasons.27	  	  We	  are	  changed,	  in	  this	  way,	  from	  seeking	  external	  justifications	  for	  the	  world	  to	  understanding	  language	  within	  itself,	  as	  showing	  from	  the	  inside	  its	  sense.	  	  	   Of	  course,	  this	  was	  not	  the	  argument	  that	  people,	  especially	  those	  in	  the	  Vienna	  Circle,	  understood	  Wittgenstein	  to	  be	  making.	  Because	  of	  these	  misinterpretations,	  Wittgenstein	  was	  drawn	  back	  into	  the	  foray	  of	  philosophical	  discourse	  many	  years	  after	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  With	  the	  hope	  that	  he	  could	  at	  last	  reorient	  his	  readers,	  Wittgenstein	  strove,	  through	  a	  very	  different	  method,	  to	  reformulate	  the	  Tractatus	  in	  a	  new,	  much	  longer,	  collection	  of	  remarks:	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations.	  Because	  of	  the	  radical	  shift	  in	  style,	  and	  especially	  to	  those	  who	  did	  not	  read	  the	  irony	  accorded	  to	  the	  Tractatus	  by	  its	  frame,	  the	  
Investigations	  appear	  to	  be	  largely	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  earlier	  work.	  However,	  I	  have	  argued,	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  show,	  that	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  continuity	  between	  the	  two	  texts.	  What	  the	  latter	  does	  quite	  successfully,	  in	  any	  case,	  is	  make	  much	  more	  
                                                26	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus,	  §7.	  27	  Kremer,	  “Tractarian	  Nonsense,”	  57.	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Chapter	  2:	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  Language	  as	  a	  Philosophy	  of	  Life	  The	  account	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  that	  I	  presented	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  is,	  in	  general,	  aligned	  with	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  resolute	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  work.	  It	  emphasizes	  the	  continuities	  between	  Wittgenstein’s	  earlier	  and	  later	  works,	  and	  tries	  to	  understand	  the	  former	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  latter	  does	  not	  appear	  as	  wholly	  revisionary.	  I	  have	  drawn	  on	  Cora	  Diamond’s	  reading	  of	  the	  Preface	  and	  concluding	  remarks	  as	  constituting	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  out	  its	  implied	  ethical	  attitude.	  This	  attitude,	  which	  I	  derive	  from	  Michael	  Kremer’s	  work,	  is	  one	  that	  changes	  our	  expectations	  of	  language	  from	  being	  externally	  justificatory	  to	  internally	  revelatory.	  The	  Tractatus,	  read	  in	  this	  way,	  should	  liberate	  the	  reader	  to	  live	  freely	  in	  the	  world,	  unburdened	  by	  philosophical	  dilemmas.	  	   However,	  as	  I	  pointed	  out,	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  not	  necessarily	  easy	  to	  draw	  out	  from	  the	  text,	  and	  it	  would	  have	  been	  especially	  difficult	  without	  the	  context	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  work.	  The	  resolute	  reading	  is	  indeed	  an	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  the	  Tractatus	  with	  the	  philosophy	  that	  Wittgenstein	  proffered	  after	  its	  publication,	  which	  much	  more	  obviously	  exposes	  his	  approach	  to	  language	  and	  to	  life	  and,	  in	  fact,	  makes	  explicit	  critiques	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  Standard	  readers	  of	  Wittgenstein,	  to	  which	  the	  resolute	  readers	  are	  opposed,	  point	  to	  these	  critiques	  as	  damning	  evidence	  that	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  was	  largely	  concerned	  with	  revising	  his	  earlier,	  more	  naive	  philosophy.	  Comments	  found	  in	  the	  various	  letters,	  lectures,	  and	  remarks	  of	  the	  “middle	  Wittgenstein”	  and	  the	  obvious	  objections	  to	  the	  
Tractatus	  found	  in	  the	  Investigations	  would	  seem	  to	  show	  that	  the	  latter	  is	  largely	  revisionary.	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Although	  not	  a	  standard	  reader	  himself,	  James	  Conant	  offers	  a	  nice	  summary	  of	  their	  argument	  as	  follows:	  The	  Tractatus	  and	  the	  Investigations	  are	  both	  trying	  to	  answer	  the	  same	  philosophical	  questions,	  but	  in	  each	  case	  in	  which	  early	  Wittgenstein	  aimed	  to	  show	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  a	  given	  philosophical	  question	  was	  p,	  later	  Wittgenstein	  aims	  to	  refute	  his	  earlier	  self	  and	  show	  instead	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  is	  really	  not	  p.28	  	  In	  arguing	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  later	  efforts	  generally	  negate	  the	  propositions	  of	  the	  
Tractatus,	  the	  standard	  reading	  characterizes	  the	  dispute	  as	  regarding	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  content	  of	  that	  early	  philosophy.	  Some	  of	  topics	  on	  which	  Wittgenstein	  apparently	  wavers	  might	  include	  (though	  not	  exhaustively	  so):	  -­‐ the	  conception	  of	  the	  task	  of	  logical	  analysis	  -­‐ the	  relationship	  between	  the	  world	  and	  thought	  -­‐ the	  role	  that	  elementary	  propositions	  can	  play	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  non-­‐elementary	  propositions	  -­‐ the	  possibility	  itself	  of	  fully	  analyzing	  any	  proposition	  to	  its	  elementary	  form29	  	  These,	  of	  course,	  are	  key	  features	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  so	  the	  kind	  of	  radical	  self-­‐criticism	  that	  standard	  readers	  argue	  Wittgenstein	  undertook	  would	  be	  quite	  remarkable;	  but	  that	  is	  perhaps	  part	  of	  what	  makes	  Wittgenstein	  such	  an	  intriguing	  personality.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  evidence	  within	  the	  Investigations	  themselves	  that	  would	  suggest	  that	  this	  reading	  is	  correct.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  number	  of	  propositions	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  does	  indeed	  seem	  to	  offer	  an	  implicit	  revision	  of	  the	  elements	  of	  
                                                28	  James	  Conant,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Later	  Criticism	  of	  the	  Tractatus,”	  in	  Wittgenstein:	  The	  Philosopher	  
and	  His	  Works,	  eds.	  A.	  Pichler	  and	  S.	  Säätelä	  (Frankfurt:	  ontos	  verlag,	  2006),	  173.	  29	  This	  list	  is	  a	  paraphrasing	  of	  that	  provided	  by	  Ian	  Proops	  in	  his	  essay,	  “The	  New	  Wittgenstein:	  A	  Critique,”	  in	  the	  European	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  vol.	  9,	  no.	  3	  (2001):	  275-­‐404.	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his	  past	  philosophy,	  there	  are	  a	  few	  times	  where	  he	  explicitly	  names	  the	  error	  of	  the	  
Tractatus:	  	  For	  since	  I	  began	  to	  occupy	  myself	  with	  philosophy	  again,	  sixteen	  years	  ago,	  I	  could	  not	  but	  recognize	  the	  grave	  mistakes	  in	  what	  I	  set	  out	  in	  that	  first	  book.30	  	  [It]	  is	  impossible	  to	  give	  an	  explanatory	  account	  of	  any	  primary	  element,	  since	  for	  it,	  there	  is	  nothing	  other	  than	  mere	  naming;	  after	  all,	  its	  name	  is	  all	  it	  has.	  …	  Both	  Russell’s	  “individuals”	  and	  my	  “objects”	  (Tractatus	  Logico-­‐
Philosophicus)	  were	  likewise	  such	  primary	  elements.	  …	  To	  the	  philosophical	  question	  “Is	  the	  visual	  image	  of	  this	  tree	  composite,	  and	  what	  are	  its	  constituent	  parts?”	  the	  correct	  answer	  is	  “That	  depends	  on	  what	  you	  understand	  by	  ‘composite.’”	  (And	  that,	  of	  course,	  is	  not	  an	  answer	  to,	  but	  a	  rejection	  of,	  the	  question.)31	  
	  
Tractatus	  Logico-­‐Philosophicus	  (4.5):	  “The	  general	  form	  of	  propositions	  is:	  This	  is	  how	  things	  are.”	  —	  That	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  proposition	  one	  repeats	  to	  oneself	  countless	  times.	  One	  thinks	  that	  one	  is	  tracing	  nature	  over	  and	  over	  again,	  and	  one	  is	  merely	  tracing	  round	  the	  frame	  through	  which	  we	  look	  at	  it.32	  	  A	  picture	  held	  us	  captive.	  And	  we	  couldn’t	  get	  outside	  it,	  for	  it	  lay	  in	  our	  language,	  and	  language	  seemed	  only	  to	  repeat	  it	  to	  us	  inexorably.33	  	  What	  these	  criticisms	  hold	  in	  common	  is,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  hidden	  metaphysical	  structure	  on	  which	  the	  force	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  staked.	  Even	  in	  that	  early	  work,	  Wittgenstein	  was	  clear	  that	  his	  intent	  was	  to	  forward	  a	  method	  of	  philosophy	  that	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  say	  anything	  about	  metaphysics.34	  And	  yet,	  by	  the	  standard	  reading,	  the	  Tractatus	  pointed	  to	  certain	  “intrinsic	  features	  of	  an	  
                                                30	  Wittgenstein,	  preface	  to	  Philosophical	  Investigations.	  31	  Ibid.,	  §§46-­‐47.	  32	  Ibid.,	  §114.	  33	  Ibid.,	  §115.	  34	  See	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus,	  §6.53.	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independent	  reality	  …	  which	  cannot	  be	  described,	  but	  which	  our	  language	  shows.”35	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  while	  in	  the	  last	  chapter	  I	  argued	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus	  does	  indeed	  show	  us	  something,	  the	  text	  remains	  resolutely	  anti-­‐metaphysical.	  In	  contrast	  to	  standard	  readers,	  I	  maintain	  that	  what	  is	  shown	  is	  not	  some	  hidden,	  ideal	  world	  of	  pure	  logic.	  What	  we	  see	  through	  the	  
Tractatus,	  on	  my	  reading,	  is	  the	  world,	  plainly	  as	  it	  is.	  One	  could	  think	  of	  it	  like	  this:	  standard	  readers	  see	  Wittgenstein’s	  ladder	  as	  elevating	  us	  onto	  an	  ideal	  metaphysical	  plane,	  while	  resolute	  readers	  see	  the	  ladder	  as	  leading	  us	  nowhere	  except	  to	  the	  actual	  ground.	  	   Given	  that	  the	  standard	  readers	  view	  the	  Tractatus	  as	  being	  ultimately	  caught	  up	  in	  this	  insidious	  metaphysics—presenting	  a	  philosophical	  picture	  that	  Wittgenstein	  desperately	  wanted	  to	  avoid—	  it	  is	  unsurprising,	  they	  claim,	  that	  Wittgenstein	  eventually	  concluded	  the	  book	  was	  as	  dogmatic	  as	  the	  traditional	  philosophy	  it	  was	  meant	  to	  undermine.36	  The	  Investigations,	  then,	  were	  essentially	  tasked	  with	  undoing	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  	   How	  might	  a	  resolute	  reader,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  evidence	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  revisionism,	  comport	  the	  Investigations	  with	  the	  Tractatus?	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  the	  apparent	  conversions	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  thought	  might	  be	  responding	  to	  the	  common	  
misreading	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  That	  is,	  Wittgenstein	  saw	  how	  he	  had	  been	  misunderstood,	  and	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  explicate	  that	  error	  to	  his	  readers,	  he	  took	  up	  the	  position	  of	  critic	  of	  his	  own	  work,	  and	  determined	  to	  reformulate	  it	  in	  a	  more	  
                                                35	  Marie	  McGinn,	  “Between	  Metaphysics	  and	  Nonsense:	  Elucidation	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  Tractatus,”	  The	  
Philosophical	  Quarterly	  49,	  no.	  197	  (1999):	  493.	  36	  See	  Conant,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Later	  Criticism.”	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accessible	  way.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  scholar	  Warren	  Goldfarb	  puts	  it,	  Wittgenstein	  takes	  on	  a	  kind	  of	  “intentional	  naiveté”	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  out	  the	  strength	  and	  versatility	  of	  ordinary	  language	  in	  showing	  us	  our	  world.37	  In	  this	  light,	  we	  might	  take	  the	  
Investigations	  to	  be	  that	  which	  Wittgenstein	  told	  von	  Ficker,	  we	  will	  recall,	  he	  had	  left	  unwritten.	  That	  is,	  the	  ethical	  point	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  which	  Wittgenstein	  had	  previously	  passed	  over	  in	  silence,	  is	  in	  the	  Investigations	  given	  a	  more	  recognizable	  voice.38	  Approaching	  the	  Investigations	  with	  this	  attitude,	  the	  criticisms	  of	  the	  
Tractatus	  are	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  as	  disingenuous,	  but	  as	  addressing	  a	  certain	  philosophical	  impetus	  that	  is	  indeed	  to	  be	  found	  in	  that	  early	  work,	  but	  which	  is	  also	  refuted	  by	  the	  Tractatus.	  The	  two	  texts,	  then,	  are	  indeed	  trying	  to	  answer	  the	  same	  philosophical	  questions,	  but	  their	  most	  essential	  difference	  is	  in	  form,	  not	  content.	  As	  Conant	  writes:	  The	  task	  of	  the	  later	  philosophy	  lies	  in	  seeking	  a	  way	  to	  retain	  these	  early	  original	  aspirations	  to	  perspicuity	  and	  completeness	  while	  purging	  them	  of	  the	  metaphysical	  spirit	  with	  which	  they	  are	  unwittingly	  imbued	  in	  the	  early	  work.39	  	  With	  this	  change	  in	  style,	  the	  later	  Wittgenstein	  can	  thus	  escape	  the	  apparent	  dogmatism	  of	  his	  prior	  work.	  	   If	  we	  set	  aside,	  for	  a	  moment,	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  frame	  structure	  of	  the	  
Tractatus,	  then	  the	  book	  is	  written	  very	  much	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  form	  of	  a	  traditional	  philosophical	  argument.	  It	  proposes	  seven	  basic	  propositions,	  which	  
                                                37	  Warren	  D.	  Goldfarb,	  “I	  Want	  You	  to	  Bring	  Me	  a	  Slab:	  Remarks	  on	  the	  Opening	  Sections	  of	  the	  ‘Philosophical	  Investigations,’”	  Synthese	  56,	  no.	  3	  (1983):	  269.	  38	  I	  here	  refer	  to	  that	  important	  moment	  when	  Wittgenstein	  wrote,	  “my	  work	  consists	  of	  two	  parts:	  the	  one	  presented	  here	  plus	  all	  that	  I	  have	  not	  written.	  …	  In	  short,	  I	  believe	  that	  where	  many	  others	  today	  are	  just	  gassing,	  I	  have	  managed	  in	  my	  book	  to	  put	  everything	  firmly	  into	  place	  by	  being	  silent	  about	  it,”	  as	  quoted	  in	  Diamond,	  “Ethics,	  Imagination	  and	  Method,”	  149.	  39	  Conant,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Later	  Criticism,”	  194.	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build	  on	  each	  other	  to	  culminate	  in	  the	  final	  remark:	  “Whereof	  one	  cannot	  speak,	  thereof	  one	  must	  be	  silent.”40	  All	  of	  these	  propositions	  except	  the	  last	  are	  expanded	  by	  auxiliary	  propositions,	  which	  are	  explanatory	  in	  nature,	  and	  guide	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  next	  turn	  in	  the	  argument.	  The	  Tractatus,	  in	  this	  sense,	  presents	  a	  beautifully	  linear	  argument	  that	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  do	  much	  to	  invalidate	  the	  traditional	  method	  of	  philosophical	  inquiry.	  Quite	  to	  the	  contrary	  it	  seems	  to	  fall	  neatly	  in	  line	  with	  tradition.	  	   Of	  course,	  we,	  as	  resolute	  readers,	  know	  why	  Wittgenstein	  produced	  the	  
Tractatus	  in	  this	  form,	  and	  the	  irony	  with	  which	  the	  Tractarian	  argument	  is	  delivered	  is	  made	  apparent	  by	  reading	  it	  within	  its	  frame.	  But	  what	  is	  overlooked	  by	  those	  who	  do	  not	  take	  seriously	  the	  frame	  structure,	  also	  becomes	  clear	  in	  the	  radical	  rambling	  form	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  which	  stages	  and	  plays	  in	  linguistic	  scenes;	  these	  episodes	  become	  the	  substance	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophical	  study.	  In	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  text,	  Wittgenstein	  introduces	  us	  to	  this	  new	  style,	  writing:	  	  	  I	  have	  written	  down	  all	  these	  thoughts	  as	  remarks,	  short	  paragraphs,	  sometimes	  in	  longer	  chains	  about	  the	  same	  subject,	  sometimes	  jumping,	  in	  a	  sudden	  change	  from	  one	  area	  to	  another.	  …	  And	  this	  was,	  of	  course,	  connected	  to	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  investigation.	  For	  it	  compels	  us	  to	  travel	  criss-­‐cross	  in	  every	  direction	  over	  a	  wide	  field	  of	  thought.41	  	  Conant	  expounds	  on	  this	  seemingly	  innocuous	  observation,	  revealing	  that	  this	  is	  in	  fact	  precisely	  Wittgenstein’s	  way	  out	  of	  the	  seeming	  dogmatism	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  	  An	  elucidatory	  procedure	  whose	  steps	  are	  arranged	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  ladder	  is	  no	  longer	  up	  to	  this	  task:	  the	  procedure	  must	  be	  able	  to	  crisscross	  in	  such	  a	  
                                                40	  Wittgenstein,	  Tractatus,	  §7.	  41	  Wittgenstein,	  preface	  to	  Investigations.	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way	  as	  to	  allow	  each	  step	  in	  the	  investigation	  devoted	  to	  exorcising	  a	  philosophical	  demon	  to	  itself	  be	  pondered,	  reassessed,	  and	  purged,	  in	  turn,	  of	  the	  possible	  latent	  forms	  of	  overstepping	  or	  overstatement	  that	  may	  unwittingly	  have	  insinuated	  themselves	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  elucidation	  of	  the	  original	  misconception.42	  	  This	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  radicality	  of	  the	  Investigations	  is	  in	  its	  undoing	  of	  the	  linear	  argumentation	  of	  the	  Tractatus.	  What	  Wittgenstein’s	  new	  form	  provides	  for	  his	  philosophy	  is,	  then,	  not	  a	  series	  of	  propositions	  that	  rest	  one	  on	  top	  of	  the	  other,	  but	  a	  web	  of	  propositions	  and	  arguments	  that	  interweave,	  and	  together	  form	  what	  one	  is	  tempted	  to	  call	  the	  terrain—as	  ground	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  are	  somehow	  above	  this	  land,	  while	  this	  expression	  embeds	  us	  in	  it.	  This	  arrangement	  of	  the	  argument	  in	  the	  Investigations	  breaks	  down	  the	  linear	  structure	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  rebuilds	  it	  according	  to	  the	  “long	  and	  meandering	  journeys”	  that	  its	  reconfiguration	  inspires.43	  In	  a	  sense,	  where	  the	  Tractatus	  hoped	  to	  get	  us	  to	  let	  go	  of	  the	  ladder,	  the	  
Investigations	  show	  us	  that	  the	  ladder	  is	  not	  at	  all	  necessary;	  the	  illusion	  that	  we	  needed	  to	  climb	  up	  to	  anything	  is	  dissolved,	  and	  we	  instead	  realize	  ourselves	  to	  be	  climbing	  through,	  on,	  and	  over	  the	  ground	  itself.	  	   That	  we	  are	  embedded	  in	  the	  terrain	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  in	  the	  
Investigations	  is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  description	  of	  meaning	  that	  he	  now	  offers.	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  positioning	  of	  meaning	  that	  located	  by	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  anticipates	  what	  is	  known	  as	  the	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory	  of	  the	  Investigations.	  Wittgenstein	  presents	  the	  idea	  relatively	  early	  on,	  as	  a	  remark	  in	  §43:	  
                                                42	  Conant,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Later	  Criticism,”	  196.	  43	  Wittgenstein,	  preface	  to	  Investigations.	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For	  a	  large	  class	  of	  cases	  of	  the	  employment	  of	  the	  word	  ‘meaning’—though	  not	  for	  all—this	  word	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  this	  way:	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  its	  use	  in	  the	  language.	  	  In	  my	  discussion	  of	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  of	  meaning,	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  might	  understand	  Wittgenstein	  as	  suggesting	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  was	  determined	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  proposition;	  the	  word	  means	  something	  in	  only	  in	  its	  relation	  to	  other	  words	  in	  the	  sentence.	  A	  possible	  problem,	  as	  I	  have	  shown,	  with	  this	  sketch	  of	  the	  mechanics	  of	  meaning	  is	  that	  it	  is	  vulnerable	  to	  an	  insidiously	  metaphysical	  reading.	  Although	  the	  necessity	  of	  context	  that	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  emphasizes	  points	  to	  the	  corresponding	  rootedness	  of	  meaning	  in	  the	  ground	  of	  our	  actual	  lives,	  the	  formulation	  of	  such	  a	  theory	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  positive	  meta-­‐explanation	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  can	  lead	  us	  to	  the	  confused	  pursuit	  of	  an	  ideal	  justificatory	  logic.	  Like	  many	  of	  the	  remarks	  in	  the	  Investigations,	  §43	  approaches	  the	  same	  point	  that	  the	  picture-­‐theory	  tried	  to	  show,	  but	  avoids	  slipping	  into	  metaphysically-­‐oriented	  language.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	  this	  claim,	  and	  the	  broader	  argument	  in	  which	  it	  is	  situated,	  will	  not	  only	  help	  us	  to	  see	  how	  Wittgenstein’s	  method	  has	  shifted	  since	  the	  Tractatus,	  but	  also	  the	  deep	  and	  ethical	  significance	  of	  the	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use	  theory.	  	   The	  first	  thing	  that	  we	  might	  notice	  about	  the	  remark	  in	  §43	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein	  apparently	  limits	  the	  propriety	  of	  this	  description	  of	  meaning	  to	  a	  “large	  class	  of	  cases.”	  Already,	  then,	  we	  see	  that	  Wittgenstein	  is	  operating	  at	  a	  very	  different	  register,	  one	  in	  which	  there	  is	  space	  permitted	  for	  exception,	  for	  difference.	  For	  whatever	  can	  be	  said	  about	  what	  “meaning”	  means,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  now	  careful	  to	  specify	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  all	  employments	  of	  the	  word.	  In	  most	  cases,	  then,	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when	  we	  ask	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word,	  what	  we	  are	  seeking	  is	  how	  that	  word	  is	  being	  used	  in	  the	  sentence—something	  we	  can	  see	  is	  very	  close	  to	  meaning	  according	  to	  the	  picture	  theory.	  But	  in	  some	  cases,	  we	  will	  find	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  name	  is	  best	  given	  by	  “pointing	  to	  its	  bearer.”44	  On	  these	  occasions,	  explaining	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  looks	  more	  like	  giving	  its	  ostensive	  definition.	  	  It	  is	  significant	  that	  Wittgenstein	  should	  admit	  a	  place	  for	  ostensive	  definition	  in	  his	  later	  philosophy,	  because	  he	  is	  so	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  writing	  doggedly	  in	  opposition	  to	  such	  a	  conception	  of	  meaning.	  The	  opening	  of	  the	  text	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  evidence	  of	  just	  this	  reading.	  Wittgenstein	  cites	  Augustine,	  who	  recounts	  how	  he	  came	  to	  understand	  what	  people	  meant	  by	  connecting—with	  the	  help	  of	  gestures,	  facial	  expressions,	  tone	  of	  voice—their	  words	  with	  what	  they	  intended	  to	  point	  out.45	  This	  does	  indeed	  illustrate	  a	  long	  process	  of	  ostensive	  definition,	  which	  Wittgenstein	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  call	  a	  “primitive”	  picture	  of	  language.46	  Taking	  such	  an	  inadequate	  account	  as	  its	  starting	  place,	  the	  Investigations	  would	  seem,	  then,	  to	  be	  written	  as	  the	  exact	  counterpoint	  to	  this	  picture.	  And	  the	  alternative	  notion	  of	  meaning	  that	  the	  Investigations	  offer,	  of	  course,	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning-­‐as-­‐use.	  	  However,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  Augustinian	  account	  of	  meaning	  is	  not	  that	  figures	  meaning	  as	  ostensive	  definition,	  but	  that	  it	  figures	  meaning	  as	  only	  ostensive	  definition.	  Wittgenstein	  takes	  the	  first	  step	  toward	  this	  critique	  by	  noting	  that	  “Augustine	  does	  not	  mention	  any	  difference	  between	  kinds	  of	  word.”47	  That	  he	  goes	  
                                                44	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations,	  §43.	  45	  See	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations	  §1.	  	  46	  Ibid.,	  §2.	  47	  Ibid.,	  §1.	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on	  to	  suggest	  the	  differences	  between	  parts	  of	  speech—nouns,	  adjectives,	  verbs,	  and	  the	  rest—might	  lead	  us	  to	  think	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  objection	  is	  merely	  this:	  the	  account	  of	  meaning	  as	  ostensive	  definition	  is	  insufficient	  because	  it	  can	  only	  deal	  with	  the	  names	  of	  things.	  But	  to	  hold	  our	  doubts	  here	  would	  be,	  I	  think,	  a	  rather	  superficial	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein.	  The	  deep	  challenge	  that	  Wittgenstein	  raises	  against	  ostensive	  definition	  is	  that	  the	  Augustinian	  formulation	  of	  how	  meaning	  operates	  in	  language	  limits	  the	  account	  of	  what	  language	  can	  do.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  3	   Augustine,	  we	  might	  say,	  does	  describe	  a	  system	  of	  communication;	  only	  not	  everything	  that	  we	  call	  language	  is	  this	  system.	  And	  one	  has	  to	  say	  this	  in	  several	  cases	  where	  the	  question	  arises	  “Will	  that	  description	  do	  or	  not?”	  The	  answer	  is:	  “Yes,	  it	  will,	  but	  only	  for	  this	  narrowly	  circumscribed	  area,	  not	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  what	  you	  were	  purporting	  to	  describe.”	  	  Here,	  Wittgenstein	  exposes	  for	  us	  the	  fact	  that	  not	  only	  does	  ostensive	  definition	  miss	  the	  variety	  of	  parts	  of	  speech,	  but	  also	  restricts	  the	  power	  of	  language,	  the	  movement	  and	  flexibility	  of	  language.	  That	  is,	  a	  language	  that	  truly	  accords	  with	  the	  Augustinian	  picture—such	  as	  the	  one	  used	  by	  the	  builders	  of	  §2	  that	  Wittgenstein	  describes—would	  be	  limited	  quite	  obviously	  in	  its	  vocabulary,	  but	  would	  be	  even	  more	  severely	  deprived	  in	  that	  it	  could	  only	  be	  used	  for	  one	  activity:	  building.	  	  As	  Rush	  Rhees,	  Wittgenstein’s	  close	  friend	  and	  literary	  executor,	  interprets	  it:	  The	  trouble	  is	  not	  to	  imagine	  a	  people	  with	  a	  language	  of	  such	  a	  limited	  vocabulary.	  The	  trouble	  is	  to	  imagine	  that	  they	  spoke	  the	  language	  only	  to	  give	  these	  special	  orders	  on	  this	  job	  and	  otherwise	  never	  spoke	  at	  all.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  it	  would	  be	  speaking	  a	  language.48	  	  
                                                48	  Rush	  Rhees,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Builders,”	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society	  60	  (1960):	  177.	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A	  language	  must	  be	  much	  richer	  than	  that	  of	  the	  builders,	  because	  what	  people	  do	  with	  language	  is	  so	  much	  more	  varied.	  	   This	  brings	  me	  to	  the	  second	  thing	  that	  we	  might	  notice	  about	  Wittgenstein’s	  new	  formulation	  of	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning.	  In	  the	  Tractatus,	  meaning	  was	  situated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  proposition,	  which	  constituted	  a	  kind	  of	  picture	  to	  ourselves.	  This	  imagery	  presented	  a	  rather	  static	  notion	  of	  meaning,	  although	  one	  could	  infer	  that	  the	  meaning	  must	  change	  according	  to	  the	  proposition.	  In	  the	  
Investigations,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  Wittgenstein	  locates	  meaning	  within	  the	  highly	  active	  context	  of	  use.	  With	  this,	  Wittgenstein	  orients	  our	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  misguided	  imaginations	  of	  a	  traditional	  philosophical	  method,	  and	  toward	  imaginable	  scenes,	  instances	  in	  which	  people	  actually	  engage	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  language.	  It	  is	  through	  this	  consideration	  of	  language	  as	  an	  activity	  that	  we	  come	  to	  truly	  understand	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  and	  the	  way	  that	  meaning	  operates	  within	  it.	  	   Wittgenstein	  often	  compares	  the	  use	  of	  language	  to	  playing	  a	  game,	  and	  the	  
Investigations	  can	  be	  read	  as	  presenting	  a	  variety	  of	  these	  language-­‐games	  as	  a	  way	  of	  illustrating	  their	  roles	  in	  our	  lives.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  notes,	  “[the]	  word	  ‘language-­‐
game	  is	  used	  here	  to	  emphasize	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  speaking	  of	  language	  is	  part	  of	  an	  activity,	  or	  of	  a	  form	  of	  life.”49	  We	  might	  be	  surprised,	  though,	  to	  find	  that	  when	  Wittgenstein	  provides	  examples	  of	  these	  language	  games,	  he	  does	  not	  include	  languages	  from	  around	  the	  world	  such	  as	  German,	  English,	  French,	  Japanese,	  etc.	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  these	  are	  languages,	  but	  he	  wants	  to	  point	  to	  the	  
                                                49	  Ibid.,	  §23.	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things	  we	  accomplish	  within	  each	  of	  these	  as	  the	  games	  we	  play.	  So,	  he	  lists	  things	  such	  as	  giving	  and	  receiving	  orders,	  speculating	  about	  something,	  telling	  a	  story,	  telling	  a	  joke,	  “requesting,	  thanking,	  cursing,	  greeting,	  praying.”50	  What	  this	  shows	  is	  that	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  language	  is	  not	  something	  that	  stands	  apart	  from	  the	  scenes	  of	  life,	  but	  is	  constitutive	  of	  them.	  Language	  is	  lively,	  and	  cannot	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  very	  human	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  is	  employed.	  	   When	  Wittgenstein	  writes,	  then,	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  can	  often	  be	  explained	  by	  its	  use	  in	  the	  language,	  what	  he	  shows	  is	  that	  meaning	  is,	  in	  many	  cases,	  that	  activity	  of	  climbing	  through,	  on,	  and	  over	  the	  terrain	  of	  language.	  As	  Conant	  argues,	  Wittgenstein	  is	  leading	  us	  away	  from	  the	  temptation	  that	  meaning	  is	  a	  property	  of	  the	  sentence,	  “which	  it	  then	  carries	  with	  it—like	  an	  atmosphere	  accompanying	  it—into	  each	  specific	  occasion	  of	  use.”51	  The	  attempt	  to	  peer	  into	  this	  atmosphere	  to	  discover	  meaning	  is	  the	  futile	  task	  of	  traditional	  philosophy	  that	  imagines	  a	  metaphysics	  that	  can	  provide	  it	  with	  answers.	  Wittgenstein’s	  description	  of	  language-­‐games,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  calls	  our	  attention	  simply	  to	  seeing	  what	  the	  language	  does,	  how	  it	  works	  in	  the	  world.	  As	  Conant	  explains:	  What	  constitutes	  your	  meaning	  thus-­‐and-­‐so	  by	  uttering	  a	  sentence	  is	  not	  your	  engaging	  in	  a	  psychological	  act	  …	  but	  in	  your	  employing	  the	  sentence	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  the	  sentence	  is	  able	  to	  do	  the	  ...	  work	  of	  meaning	  thus-­‐and-­‐so.52	  	  To	  some,	  this	  may	  sound	  rather	  unhelpfully	  tautological:	  the	  word	  means	  what	  it	  means	  in	  its	  use.	  This	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  tell	  us	  at	  a	  deeper	  level	  how	  the	  word	  means	  
                                                50	  Ibid.	  51	  Conant,	  “Wittgenstein	  on	  Meaning	  and	  Use,”	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  21,	  no.	  3	  (1998):	  241.	  52	  Ibid.,	  239.	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this,	  or	  how	  we	  know	  that	  it	  does	  mean	  this.	  Wittgenstein’s	  point,	  however,	  is	  precisely	  to	  show	  us	  that	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  philosophical	  assumption	  that	  we	  stand	  in	  need	  of	  assurance	  of	  meaning	  in	  this	  regard	  that	  is	  misguided	  and	  leads	  us	  to	  confusion.	  Such	  questions	  make	  themselves	  appear	  impossible	  to	  answer	  with	  certainty,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  questions	  that	  we	  need	  to	  answer	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  meaning	  of	  language.	  We	  play	  language-­‐games,	  and	  we	  show	  our	  meaning	  by	  how	  we	  use	  our	  language.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  says,	  “This	  is	  simply	  what	  I	  do.”53	  In	  this	  way,	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  is	  also	  a	  philosophy	  of	  life.	  Its	  anti-­‐metaphysical,	  non-­‐linear	  form	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  deconstruction	  of	  traditional	  methods	  of	  philosophy.	  It	  prioritizes	  the	  ordinary,	  rough	  ground	  of	  life	  over	  the	  supposed	  purity	  of	  logic,	  providing	  us	  the	  traction	  we	  need	  to	  walk.	  The	  project	  of	  philosophy	  is	  no	  longer	  to	  justify	  how	  we	  speak	  of	  life,	  but	  examine	  what	  our	  use	  of	  language	  can	  tell	  us	  about	  our	  way	  of	  living.	  As	  Wittgenstein	  insightfully	  notes:	  	  What	  is	  true	  or	  false	  is	  what	  human	  beings	  say;	  and	  it	  is	  in	  their	  language	  that	  human	  beings	  agree.	  This	  is	  an	  agreement	  not	  in	  opinions,	  but	  rather	  in	  form	  of	  life.54	  	  By	  showing	  that	  language	  is	  immanent	  to	  life,	  Wittgenstein	  anticipates	  the	  deconstructive	  method	  introduced	  by	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  who	  only	  came	  onto	  the	  scene	  a	  few	  decades	  after	  Wittgenstein’s	  death.	  Henry	  Staten,	  who	  picks	  up	  on	  this	  connection	  in	  his	  book	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Derrida,	  expounds	  on	  the	  deconstructive	  
                                                53	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations,	  §217.	  54	  Ibid.,	  §241.	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tone	  we	  find	  in	  the	  Investigations.55	  He	  argues	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  method	  of	  doing	  philosophy	  through	  scenes	  of	  linguistic	  encounters	  takes	  seriously	  the	  power	  of	  our	  ordinary	  language	  and	  shows	  that	  the	  limits	  of	  expressible	  thought,	  originally	  sought	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  are	  set	  by	  the	  landscape	  of	  everyday	  life.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  reorientation	  toward	  life—which	  Wittgenstein	  hoped	  to	  bring	  out	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  and	  which	  is	  more	  obviously	  brought	  out	  in	  the	  
Investigations—could	  be	  captured	  by	  the	  new	  aim	  of	  philosophy	  that	  it	  ushers	  in.	  This	  aim	  is	  that	  philosophy	  should	  be	  essentially	  therapeutic.	  But	  Wittgenstein	  does	  not	  propose	  that	  philosophy	  is	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  endeavor.	  “There	  is	  not	  a	  single	  philosophical	  method,	  though	  there	  are	  indeed	  methods,	  different	  therapies,	  as	  it	  were.”56	  Wittgenstein	  resists	  dogmatism	  in	  his	  philosophy,	  suggesting	  instead	  that	  the	  method,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  subject,	  should	  essentially	  arise	  from	  the	  life	  of	  the	  philosopher.57	  Through	  this	  kind	  of	  philosophy,	  we	  can	  learn	  how	  to	  liberate	  ourselves.	  “What	  is	  your	  aim	  in	  philosophy?—To	  show	  the	  fly	  the	  way	  out	  of	  the	  fly-­‐bottle.”58	  Wittgenstein	  says	  that	  this	  free	  life,	  relieved	  of	  the	  entrapments	  of	  traditional	  philosophy,	  is	  one	  that	  no	  longer	  expects	  of	  language	  the	  ability	  to	  convey	  “the	  ultimate	  meaning	  of	  life,	  the	  absolute	  good,	  the	  absolute	  valuable,”	  which	  is	  to	  say,	  Ethics.59	  To	  do	  so	  is	  to	  try	  to	  force	  language	  beyond	  itself,	  to	  ask	  it	  for	  its	  own	  justification,	  to	  forget	  that	  “all	  propositions	  stand	  on	  the	  same	  level	  …	  
                                                55	  Henry	  Staten,	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Derrida.	  Lincoln,	  NE:	  University	  of	  Nebraska	  Press,	  1984.	  56	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations,	  §133d.	  57	  See	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations	  §133.	  58	  Ibid.,	  §309.	  59	  Wittgenstein,	  “I:	  A	  Lecture	  on	  Ethics.”	  The	  Philosophical	  Review	  74,	  no.	  1	  (1965):	  12.	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[none	  of	  which]	  in	  any	  absolute	  sense,	  are	  sublime,	  important,	  or	  trivial.”60	  Ethical	  language,	  in	  short,	  slips	  easily	  into	  nonsense.	  Ethics	  is	  not	  a	  science;	  there	  is	  not	  something	  absolute	  for	  us	  to	  learn	  in	  Ethics,	  and	  we	  cannot	  hope	  to	  know	  what	  is	  the	  Good	  through	  language.	  	  However,	  that	  Ethical	  language	  is	  nonsense	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Ethics	  itself	  must	  be	  entirely	  done	  away	  with.	  It	  cannot	  be	  done	  away	  with	  because	  of	  the	  very	  human	  desire	  to	  say	  something	  about	  it.	  What	  can	  be	  changed	  is	  our	  attitude	  toward	  Ethics.	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  of	  language	  as	  life	  changes	  our	  understanding	  of	  Ethics	  as	  something	  to	  be	  wondered	  at	  and	  decided	  to	  something	  that	  is	  lived.	  It	  is	  internal	  to	  the	  language;	  shown,	  in	  a	  sense,	  not	  said.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  entirely	  wrong	  to	  call	  Ethics	  transcendental	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  incredible	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  is	  that	  through	  this	  conception	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  that	  he	  has	  developed,	  the	  transcendentality	  of	  Ethics	  is	  still	  never	  something	  outside	  of	  our	  world.	  It	  is,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  from	  deep	  within	  our	  world	  that	  Ethics	  shows	  itself	  in	  our	  language.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  Good	  is	  not	  something	  to	  be	  governed,	  but	  something	  to	  be	  done.	  	  The	  political	  ramifications	  of	  this	  new	  attitude	  toward	  Ethics	  are	  intense.	  To	  understand	  them,	  especially	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  censorship	  of	  hate	  speech,	  we	  must	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  famous	  private	  language	  argument	  of	  the	  
Investigations.	  In	  realizing	  the	  impossibility	  of	  a	  truly	  private	  language,	  we	  will	  come	  to	  see	  the	  essential	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  theory	  of	  meaning:	  that	  meaning	  is	  
                                                60	  Ibid.,	  6.	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Chapter	  3:	  From	  Private	  Language	  to	  Public	  Good	  In	  the	  last	  chapter,	  I	  defended	  a	  reading	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  Investigations	  that	  appreciates	  his	  philosophy	  of	  language	  as	  a	  philosophy	  of	  life.	  By	  conducting	  his	  investigations	  from	  within	  the	  linguistic	  scenes	  that	  he	  illustrates,	  Wittgenstein	  shows	  that	  meaning	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  divorced	  from	  the	  instance	  of	  use.	  Meaning	  does	  not	  exist	  on	  some	  metaphysical	  level,	  only	  to	  be	  ushered	  in	  through	  the	  word.	  It	  is,	  rather,	  something	  that	  we	  make	  to	  ourselves	  as	  we	  walk,	  run,	  and	  stumble	  over	  the	  landscape	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  is	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy,	  rather	  than	  leading	  us—as	  traditional	  methods	  have	  the	  tendency	  to	  do—into	  the	  confused	  misunderstandings,	  presents	  us	  with	  an	  opportunity	  for	  real	  philosophical	  liberation.	  We	  might,	  so	  to	  speak,	  find	  our	  way	  out	  of	  the	  fly	  bottle.	  But	  this	  would	  seem	  to	  come	  at	  a	  hefty	  price,	  for	  while	  this	  reorientation	  to	  the	  world	  dissolves	  our	  impossible	  demand	  for	  its	  justification,	  we	  are	  also	  required	  to	  let	  go	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  strictly	  sensical	  language	  of	  Ethics.	  Our	  endeavors	  to	  put	  into	  words	  the	  absolute	  Good	  are	  futile	  attempts	  at	  making	  logical	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  logically	  senseless.	  	  	   However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Wittgenstein’s	  brilliance	  is	  that	  even	  as	  he	  points	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  sense	  and	  senseless,	  he	  does	  not	  demand	  that	  we	  give	  up	  entirely	  on	  the	  latter.	  He	  understands	  that	  what	  is	  named	  senseless	  by	  strict	  logical	  analysis	  is	  not	  worthless	  for	  human	  life.	  Quite	  the	  opposite,	  in	  the	  “Lecture	  on	  Ethics,”	  Wittgenstein	  says	  that	  Ethics	  deserves	  a	  deep	  respect,	  for	  it	  is	  “a	  document	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of	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  human	  mind”	  to	  discover	  the	  Good.61	  The	  respectability	  of	  this	  effort,	  however	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  task	  of	  writing	  or	  talking	  Ethics	  is	  any	  less	  impossible;	  Wittgenstein	  maintains	  that	  “[this]	  running	  against	  the	  walls	  of	  our	  cage	  is	  perfectly,	  absolutely	  hopeless.”62	  What	  changes	  is	  how	  we	  approach	  Ethics,	  how	  we	  conceive	  of	  our	  relationship	  to	  the	  Good.	  	  	   Traditional	  philosophy,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  tries	  to	  treat	  the	  Good	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  fact,	  something	  that	  can	  be	  discovered	  and	  put	  into	  words,	  through	  a	  language-­‐game	  that	  we	  might	  call	  Ethical	  discourse.	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  the	  Good,	  as	  an	  absolute	  value,	  must	  be	  a	  fact	  that	  transcends	  the	  rough	  and	  conditional	  quality	  of	  the	  world.	  Language,	  being	  meaningful	  only	  insofar	  as	  it	  deals	  in	  the	  world,	  can	  therefore	  have	  no	  hope	  of	  accessing	  the	  supposed	  fact	  of	  the	  Good,	  and	  Ethical	  discourse	  becomes	  muddled	  and	  hopeless.	  But	  if	  the	  Good	  is	  not	  a	  fact,	  if	  it	  is	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  only	  asymptotically	  approached,	  but	  rather,	  following	  the	  pattern	  of	  Wittgensteinian	  deconstruction	  we	  have	  been	  seeing,	  if	  the	  Good	  is	  something	  that	  can	  be	  shown	  in	  ordinary	  language,	  then	  we	  might	  as	  yet	  find	  our	  peace	  with	  Ethics.	  	   The	  question	  must	  then	  be	  asked,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  show	  the	  Good?	  Or,	  perhaps	  more	  urgently,	  what	  does	  it	  mean	  to	  understand	  the	  Good	  when	  it	  is	  shown	  to	  us?	  This	  is	  the	  question	  that	  will	  drive	  this	  chapter.	  To	  begin	  to	  see	  its	  answer,	  we	  must	  first	  have	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  understand	  anything	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein.	  And	  to	  do	  this,	  we	  must	  walk	  through	  his	  famous	  private	  language	  
                                                61	  Wittgenstein,	  “Lecture	  on	  Ethics,”	  12.	  62	  Ibid.	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argument,	  which	  is	  truly	  an	  argument	  against	  the	  possibility	  of	  such	  a	  language.	  Through	  this	  process,	  we	  will	  develop	  a	  new	  relationship	  to	  the	  Good,	  one	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  if	  it	  cannot	  be	  said.	  The	  private	  language	  argument	  is	  open	  to	  question	  on	  more	  than	  one	  front—including	  even	  its	  location	  in	  the	  Investigations—not	  least	  of	  all	  because	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  enigmatic	  style.	  In	  order	  to	  grasp	  some	  of	  these	  disputes,	  it	  might	  be	  best	  to	  break	  the	  argument	  down	  into	  its	  key	  elements.	  	  First,	  what	  is	  a	  private	  language?	  On	  the	  face	  of	  it,	  this	  question	  does	  not	  have	  a	  very	  surprising	  answer:	  a	  private	  language	  is	  one	  that	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  only	  one	  individual.	  One	  way	  to	  imagine	  a	  private	  language	  might	  be	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  code,	  whose	  inventor	  is	  so	  brilliant	  that	  none	  are	  able	  to	  crack	  it.	  This	  master	  cryptographer	  could	  use	  the	  private	  language	  to	  keep	  special,	  secret	  notes	  for	  herself,	  which	  would	  be	  exclusively	  available	  for	  her	  personal	  use.	  But	  this	  scenario	  is	  complicated	  when	  we	  begin	  to	  query	  what	  exactly	  is	  meant	  by	  saying	  that	  only	  one	  person	  can	  understand	  the	  private	  language.	  Is	  this	  the	  can	  of	  logical	  possibility,	  that	  is,	  or	  is	  it	  contingent	  on	  the	  circumstances?	  	  It	  is	  not	  all	  that	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  several	  possible	  cases	  of	  a	  language	  that	  is	  private	  according	  to	  the	  latter	  criteria.	  The	  linguistic	  invention	  of	  an	  especially	  innovative	  child,	  for	  example,	  could	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  private	  language,	  so	  long	  as	  he	  does	  not	  share	  his	  genius	  with	  anyone	  else.	  Languages	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  extinction,	  which	  have	  only	  one	  surviving	  user,	  too,	  could	  be	  considered	  as	  private.	  For	  his	  own	  purposes,	  Wittgenstein	  points	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  language	  we	  might	  use	  to	  talk	  to	  ourselves	  as	  an	  illustration	  of	  this	  sort	  of	  private	  language.	  “A	  human	  being	  can	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encourage	  himself,	  give	  himself	  orders,	  obey,	  blame	  and	  punish	  himself;	  he	  can	  ask	  himself	  a	  question	  and	  answer	  it.”63	  In	  these	  kinds	  of	  cases,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  language	  depends	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  only	  one	  individual	  can	  use	  the	  language,	  but	  this	  is	  only	  because	  it	  just	  so	  happens	  that	  it	  is	  just	  this	  person	  that	  does;	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  necessarily	  stands	  in	  the	  way	  of	  others	  learning	  the	  language.	  The	  sense	  in	  which	  these	  languages	  are	  private,	  therefore,	  is	  the	  same	  in	  which	  a	  person	  might	  consider	  their	  locked	  diary	  private.	  Given	  the	  right	  key,	  it	  remains	  possible	  that	  the	  diary	  could	  be	  read	  by	  anyone.	  	  This	  circumstantially	  “private”	  language	  is	  not	  the	  kind	  to	  which	  Wittgenstein	  directs	  our	  attention.	  For	  one,	  they	  do	  not	  present	  any	  deep	  philosophical	  puzzles	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  language.	  Even	  when	  he	  takes	  the	  case	  of	  private	  soliloquy	  to	  its	  extreme	  by	  positing	  a	  society	  in	  which	  “human	  beings	  spoke	  
only	  in	  monologue,	  who	  accompanied	  their	  activities	  by	  talking	  to	  themselves,”	  Wittgenstein	  writes	  that	  this	  use	  of	  language,	  and	  its	  potential	  for	  translation,	  is	  still	  within	  our	  reasonable	  imagination	  (my	  emphasis).64	  Given	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophical	  purposes,	  such	  an	  untroubling	  conception	  of	  a	  private	  language	  could	  hardly	  be	  his	  target	  for	  investigation.	  What	  he	  is	  concerned	  with,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  logically	  private	  language,	  one	  for	  which	  the	  exclusionary	  power	  of	  can	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  language	  itself,	  not	  merely	  the	  occasion	  of	  its	  use.	  This	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  private	  language	  posited	  by	  traditional	  philosophy.	  
                                                63	  Wittgenstein,	  Investigations,	  §243.	  64	  Ibid.	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Our	  second	  question	  regarding	  Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument	  might	  be	  this:	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  philosophical	  problem	  posed	  by	  this	  logically	  private	  language?	  To	  understand	  this,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  Wittgenstein’s	  case	  of	  the	  everyday	  monologist.	  While	  imagining	  a	  group	  of	  people	  who	  spend	  all	  day	  talking	  to	  themselves,	  narrating	  their	  activities	  for	  their	  sole	  benefit,	  we	  could	  reasonably	  assume	  that	  this	  monologue	  would	  include	  details	  not	  only	  about	  their	  outward	  actions,	  but	  also	  their	  inner	  experiences,	  expressed	  through	  “resolutions	  and	  decisions.”65	  Pushing	  this	  toward	  its	  logical	  end,	  the	  interlocutor	  of	  the	  
Investigations	  then	  asks	  Wittgenstein:	  But	  isn’t	  it	  also	  conceivable	  that	  there	  be	  a	  language	  in	  which	  a	  person	  could	  write	  down	  or	  give	  voice	  to	  his	  inner	  experiences—his	  feelings,	  mods,	  and	  so	  on—for	  his	  own	  use?	  …	  The	  words	  of	  this	  language	  are	  to	  refer	  to	  what	  only	  the	  speaker	  can	  know—to	  his	  immediate	  private	  sensations.	  So	  another	  person	  cannot	  understand	  the	  language.66	  	  What	  is	  here	  suggested	  is	  that	  the	  language	  of	  inner	  experience,	  which	  is	  apparently	  accessible	  to	  only	  one	  person,	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  necessarily	  private.	  This	  would	  be	  true	  if	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  words	  was	  given	  by	  their	  reference	  to	  some	  object,	  which	  in	  this	  case	  would	  be	  some	  inner	  sensation.	  The	  problem,	  of	  course,	  is	  that	  as	  no	  other	  person	  can	  get	  inside	  my	  head,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  I	  can	  have	  no	  confidence	  that	  the	  words	  I	  use	  to	  describe	  my	  feelings	  are	  the	  right	  words.	  	  	   Barry	  Stroud	  writes	  against	  this	  formulation	  of	  private	  language	  by	  insisting	  on	  the	  very	  ordinary	  way	  in	  which	  we	  assess	  the	  efficacy	  of	  our	  language.	  That	  is,	  when	  we	  speak	  of	  external	  sense-­‐data,	  that	  which	  is	  publicly	  available,	  we	  can	  make	  
                                                65	  Ibid.	  66	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use	  of	  a	  certain	  criterion	  of	  correctness	  for	  our	  language.	  If	  a	  child	  is	  learning	  how	  to	  use	  the	  word	  blue,	  the	  parent	  can	  present	  several	  things	  that	  are	  all	  blue	  but	  which	  vary	  in	  all	  other	  kinds	  of	  ways.	  Over	  time	  and	  with	  practice,	  the	  child	  can	  learn	  that	  
blue	  refers	  to	  the	  color,	  and	  not	  the	  shape,	  size,	  location,	  etc.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  think	  of	  language-­‐acquisition	  in	  these	  terms,	  and	  it	  might	  frequently	  look	  something	  like	  this,	  although	  perhaps	  not	  quite	  so	  formally	  structured.	  As	  Stroud	  argues,	  language,	  like	  many	  skills,	  is	  learned	  through	  this	  kind	  of	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  practice.	  With	  many	  skills,	  there	  is	  nothing	  but	  practice	  to	  help	  you.	  The	  only	  ‘test’	  of	  successful	  performance	  is	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  you	  succeed	  in	  doing	  what	  you	  are	  trying	  to	  do.	  …	  A	  person	  can	  learn	  to	  speak	  correctly	  and	  mean	  something	  by	  what	  he	  says	  without	  knowing	  how	  to	  check	  to	  find	  out	  whether	  he	  is	  speaking	  correctly	  or	  meaning	  what	  he	  says.	  Correct	  applications	  of	  his	  words,	  intentionally	  produced,	  are	  enough	  for	  his	  saying	  and	  meaning	  what	  he	  does	  by	  his	  utterances.67	  	  	  Stroud’s	  argument	  for	  correct	  language	  use	  might	  thus	  call	  to	  mind	  Augustine’s	  narrative	  of	  learning	  a	  language	  through	  ostensive	  definition,	  which	  opens	  the	  
Investigations	  (and	  against	  which	  Wittgenstein	  builds	  his	  later	  philosophy).	  On	  this	  account,	  the	  trouble	  with	  an	  apparently	  private	  language,	  one	  that	  refers	  to	  inner	  sense	  data,	  is	  that	  “with	  words	  for	  such	  sensations	  there	  could	  be	  no	  decisive	  check—no	  ‘independent	  criterion’—of	  the	  correctness	  of	  their	  application.68	  Barring	  access	  to	  the	  inner	  object,	  our	  audience	  could	  hardly	  be	  expected	  to	  know	  what	  we	  meant,	  so	  that	  there	  could	  be	  no	  assessment	  whatsoever	  of	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  statement.	  
                                                67	  Barry	  Stroud,	  “Private	  Objects,	  Physical	  Objects,	  and	  Ostension,”	  in	  Meaning,	  Understanding,	  and	  
Practice:	  Philosophical	  Essays	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	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   Stroud	  argues	  that	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  falls	  into	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  artificial	  dilemma	  that	  plagues	  philosophy,	  and	  that	  Wittgenstein	  hopes	  to	  guide	  us	  out	  of.	  Even	  considering	  the	  apparent	  problem	  here,	  it	  may	  be	  clear	  to	  the	  reader	  how	  strange	  it	  is	  to	  think	  of	  inner	  sensation	  language	  that	  necessarily	  fails	  to	  effect	  the	  recipient,	  simply	  because	  the	  very	  same	  object	  is	  not	  present	  to	  them.	  When	  we	  exclaim,	  “Ouch!	  I	  am	  in	  pain!”	  our	  friend	  does	  not	  respond	  by	  doubting	  what	  exactly	  we	  could	  mean	  by	  pain	  (unless	  perhaps	  they	  suspect	  us	  to	  be	  faking	  it,	  but	  this	  would	  be	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  response).	  A	  good	  friend	  would	  ask	  what	  is	  wrong,	  or	  how	  they	  could	  help	  alleviate	  the	  pain.	  And	  it	  would	  be	  in	  provoking	  this	  response	  that	  the	  expression	  of	  my	  inner	  sensation	  of	  pain	  could	  be	  judged	  as	  successful.	  That	  is,	  the	  criterion	  of	  correctness	  for	  the	  use	  of	  this	  language	  would	  not	  be	  our	  agreement	  about	  the	  object	  of	  the	  language,	  but	  “of	  a	  person’s	  application	  of	  a	  word	  in	  conformity	  with	  a	  practice	  of	  using	  words	  in	  that	  way,	  with	  that	  kind	  of	  meaning.”69	  	  The	  cause	  of	  our	  philosophical	  confusion	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  grammar	  of	  the	  expressions	  we	  use	  to	  think	  about	  inner	  experiences.	  If	  we	  think	  of	  pain	  as	  a	  private	  
object	  that	  we	  can	  have	  but	  not	  share	  with	  anyone	  else,	  analogous	  to	  but	  essentially	  different	  from	  the	  objects	  of	  the	  external	  world,	  then	  of	  course	  there	  appears	  this	  impossible	  private	  language.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  we	  only	  think	  of	  sensations	  as	  truly	  private	  when	  we	  consider	  that	  it	  is	  only	  that	  individual	  to	  whom	  they	  belong	  who	  can	  know	  what	  they	  are.	  As	  the	  interlocutor	  of	  the	  Investigations	  claims,	  “Well,	  only	  I	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can	  know	  whether	  I	  am	  really	  in	  pain;	  another	  person	  can	  only	  surmise	  it.”70	  It	  is	  
here	  that	  we	  find	  the	  nonsense,	  for	  “I	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  learn	  of	  [my	  sensations].	  I	  
have	  them.”71	  This	  kind	  of	  meta-­‐awareness	  of	  one’s	  own	  feelings	  does	  not	  happen	  except	  in	  malformed	  philosophical	  language,	  which	  leads	  us	  unwittingly	  astray.	  But	  recognizing	  that	  the	  language	  of	  inner	  sensations	  is	  incommensurate	  with	  that	  of	  outer	  stimuli—though	  the	  success	  of	  either	  can	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  success	  in	  eliciting	  the	  intended	  kind	  of	  response—lifts	  us	  out	  of	  the	  abyss	  and	  back	  onto	  firm	  ground.	  	  Although	  Stroud	  is	  right	  to	  pursue	  a	  line	  of	  argument	  that	  finds	  philosophical	  relief	  in	  grammatical	  clarification,	  his	  final	  objection	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  private	  language	  remains	  tied	  to	  the	  circumstances	  of	  any	  particular	  language-­‐user,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  their	  incidental	  place	  within	  a	  language	  community.	  That	  is,	  if	  the	  success	  of	  someone	  using	  language	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  way	  another	  person	  responds	  to	  it,	  then	  the	  preclusion	  of	  a	  private	  language	  remains	  contingent	  not	  on	  the	  logical	  nature	  of	  language,	  but	  its	  situation	  within	  a	  community.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	  linguistic	  community	  plays	  no	  role	  in	  founding	  the	  meaning	  of	  words.	  It	  is,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  a	  crucial	  insight	  of	  the	  Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument	  that	  does	  occur	  within	  the	  context	  of	  how	  the	  community	  uses	  the	  words.	  Still,	  Wittgenstein’s	  argument	  against	  privacy	  is	  one	  in	  the	  strongest	  possible	  terms.	  	  	   This	  is	  the	  objection	  that	  David	  Pears	  holds	  up	  against	  Stroud.	  He	  argues	  that	  while	  Stroud	  points	  to	  a	  very	  important	  aspect	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  consideration	  of	  how	  meaning	  in	  language	  develops,	  he	  fails	  to	  halt	  the	  occasion	  of	  a	  private	  language	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early	  enough	  in	  its	  tracks.	  Pears	  therefore	  goes	  on	  to	  present	  the	  deeper	  objection	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  private	  language.	  	  He	  understands	  Wittgenstein’s	  argument	  against	  a	  private	  language	  as	  grounded	  in	  the	  impossibility	  of	  anyone	  learning	  such	  a	  language.	  As	  he	  sees	  it,	  Wittgenstein’s	  critique	  is	  aimed	  at	  the	  notion	  that	  human	  beings	  might	  begin	  their	  lives	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  “original	  position”	  in	  which	  they	  have	  not	  yet	  developed	  the	  connections	  between	  their	  inner	  sensations	  and	  the	  outside	  world.72	  We	  could	  think	  of	  this	  in	  terms	  of	  Locke’s	  tabula	  rasa,	  which	  stands	  in	  need	  of	  engraving	  through	  the	  process	  of	  ostensive	  definition,	  the	  repeated	  association	  of	  a	  word	  with	  an	  object,	  until	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  became	  clear.	  Stroud	  rightly	  points	  to	  the	  more	  superficial	  problems	  of	  this	  meaning	  through	  ostensive	  definition	  schema,	  which	  Pears	  expounds	  upon:	  Now	  an	  ostensive	  definition	  pins	  a	  word	  onto	  a	  particular	  object—in	  this	  case,	  a	  particular	  sense-­‐datum—but	  it	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  is	  about	  the	  object	  that	  makes	  the	  word	  applicable.	  That	  would	  emerge	  only	  if	  the	  speaker	  went	  on	  to	  apply	  the	  word	  to	  further	  objects.	  Then	  and	  only	  then	  it	  might	  become	  clear	  whether	  it	  was	  a	  word	  for	  the	  colour,	  or	  for	  the	  shape,	  or	  for	  some	  other	  property	  of	  the	  object.	  A	  single	  application	  settles	  nothing,	  not	  even	  for	  the	  speaker	  himself.	  What	  is	  needed	  is	  a	  prolonged	  sequence	  of	  applications.73	  	  
	  What	  Pears	  would	  like	  to	  show,	  however,	  is	  that	  even	  before	  the	  skeptic	  could	  doubt	  the	  criterion	  of	  correctness,	  be	  it	  in	  the	  success	  of	  the	  language	  or	  otherwise,	  a	  more	  profound	  problem	  for	  private	  language	  presents	  itself.	  	  
                                                72	  David	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  and	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  Philosophy,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Philosophical	  Studies	  10,	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  (2002):	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Pears	  argues	  that	  regardless	  of	  the	  difficulties	  in	  learning	  a	  language	  from	  
others	  involved	  in	  privacy,	  there	  would,	  from	  the	  very	  outset,	  be	  an	  impossibility	  of	  developing	  language	  at	  all	  to	  connect	  the	  physical	  world	  with	  our	  sensations	  of	  it.	  Were	  we	  truly	  born	  into	  the	  original	  position	  of	  the	  tabula	  rasa,	  that	  is,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  initial	  connection	  between	  our	  sense-­‐data	  and	  the	  external	  world	  whatsoever.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  necessarily	  private	  original	  position	  undermines	  this	  connection,	  it	  also	  deprives	  us	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  any	  language,	  regardless	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	  that	  language	  in	  communicating	  with	  others.	  The	  tabula	  
rasa,	  smooth	  and	  unmarked	  as	  it	  must	  be,	  offers	  no	  foothold	  for	  language,	  and	  dispossessed	  of	  any	  tools	  to	  chisel	  in	  our	  own,	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  one	  is	  voided.	  The	  problem	  with	  a	  logically	  private	  language,	  then,	  would	  be	  that	  its	  logical	  detachment	  from	  the	  world	  impedes	  its	  capacity	  for	  meaning	  anything	  at	  all.	  	  This	  argument	  gets	  us	  one	  more	  step	  closer	  to	  feeling	  the	  full	  force	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument,	  but	  it	  still	  relies	  on	  a	  central	  misunderstanding.	  That	  is,	  although	  Pears	  establishes	  what	  looks	  like	  a	  logically	  private	  language,	  by	  situating	  the	  failures	  of	  this	  impossible	  language	  in	  its	  inability	  to	  connect	  with	  sensation,	  even	  inner	  sensation,	  he	  opens	  his	  argument	  up	  to	  the	  critique	  that	  it	  relies	  on	  somewhat	  verificationist	  tropes.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  private	  language	  of	  strictly	  inner	  experience	  would	  be	  logically	  impotent,	  but	  this	  shortcoming	  would	  be	  the	  result	  of	  something	  even	  more	  damning	  than	  that	  “it	  would	  lack	  the	  connections	  with	  the	  physical	  world	  which	  provide	  for	  us	  the	  only	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way	  for	  one	  person	  to	  teach	  another	  his	  language.”74	  According	  to	  Pears,	  meaning	  is	  still	  grounded	  by	  the	  connection	  between	  a	  word	  and	  its	  object	  of	  reference.	  Wittgenstein’s	  genius,	  however,	  is	  to	  dislocate	  meaning	  from	  object	  and	  set	  it	  rather	  within	  the	  context	  of	  use.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  the	  sentences	  themselves	  operate	  and	  relate	  to	  one	  another,	  hang	  together,	  that	  forestalls	  the	  privacy	  of	  a	  language.	  	  	  Cora	  Diamond,	  in	  tracing	  the	  origins	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument	  back	  to	  the	  Tractatus,	  explains	  this	  point	  very	  nicely:	  The	  Tractatus	  view	  is	  that,	  if	  one	  sentence	  follows	  from	  another,	  then	  they	  are	  both	  within	  the	  space	  of	  constructible	  sentences	  of	  my	  language;	  they	  are	  both	  in	  logical	  space.	  Any	  grasp	  which	  I	  have	  of	  their	  logical	  relations	  is	  inseparable	  from	  my	  grasp	  of	  the	  sentences	  themselves,	  of	  each	  as	  a	  sentence	  saying	  that	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  is	  the	  case.	  …	  If	  I	  can	  take	  a	  sentence	  to	  stand	  in	  
logical	  relations	  to	  other	  sentences,	  then	  I	  can	  understand	  that	  sentence.	  Logic	  is	  precisely	  what	  joins	  together	  the	  sentences	  of	  the	  language	  which	  I	  do	  understand.	  …	  A	  logical	  relation	  going	  outside	  the	  space	  of	  possible	  inference	  is	  an	  incoherent	  idea[.]75	  	  	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  if	  I	  am	  able	  to	  understand	  a	  sentence,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  about	  inner	  or	  outer	  experiences,	  it	  is	  because	  that	  sentence	  stands	  in	  logical	  relation	  to	  other	  sentences	  that	  I	  also	  understand,	  and	  not	  (only)	  because	  I	  am	  connecting	  the	  words	  of	  the	  sentence	  to	  some	  object	  available	  for	  my	  reference.	  To	  a	  certain	  extent,	  then,	  Stroud	  is	  right.	  He	  correctly	  shows	  that	  the	  illusion	  of	  a	  private	  language	  is	  borne	  of	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  grammar	  of	  inner	  sensation;	  the	  words	  in	  sensation	  language	  are	  not	  meaningful	  because	  of	  their	  reference	  to	  
                                                74	  Ibid.,	  9.	  75	  Diamond,	  “Does	  Bismarck	  Have	  a	  Beetle	  in	  His	  Box?”	  in	  The	  New	  Wittgenstein,	  eds.	  Alice	  Crary	  and	  Rupert	  Read,	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2000),	  273.	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“private”	  objects,	  but	  because	  of	  how	  those	  words	  relate	  to	  the	  others	  of	  their	  context,	  including	  those	  inspired	  in	  the	  audience.	  Likewise,	  in	  fact,	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  language	  that	  is	  much	  more	  obviously	  public.	  And	  in	  this	  regard,	  Pears	  is	  also	  correct,	  insofar	  as	  his	  argument	  reveals	  the	  absurdity	  of	  an	  inner	  experience	  that	  is	  inexpressible	  on	  terms	  that	  can	  be	  understood	  by	  others.	  We	  might	  regard	  this	  as	  an	  aspect,	  at	  least,	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  holism;	  the	  apparent	  rift	  opened	  up	  by	  the	  dualism	  of	  inner	  and	  outer	  experience	  can	  be	  sutured	  with	  the	  appropriate	  analysis	  of	  the	  grammars	  of	  each.	  	   As	  Rush	  Rhees	  is	  careful	  to	  note,	  this	  holism	  is	  not	  one	  that	  centers	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  merely	  in	  the	  customs	  established	  by	  the	  community,	  as	  Saul	  Kripke	  infamously	  suggested.76	  Instead,	  Rhees	  writes:	  And	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  a	  common	  understanding	  I	  do	  not	  mean	  simply	  what	  Wittgenstein	  used	  to	  call	  an	  “agreement	  in	  reactions”	  which	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  talk	  about	  using	  the	  world	  in	  the	  same	  way	  or	  using	  it	  correctly.	  It	  has	  to	  do	  rather	  with	  what	  is	  taken	  to	  make	  sense,	  or	  with	  what	  can	  be	  understood:	  with	  what	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  say	  to	  people:	  with	  what	  anyone	  else	  who	  speaks	  the	  language	  might	  try	  to	  say.77	  	  Language,	  in	  other	  words,	  is	  not	  the	  externalization	  of	  some	  private	  mental	  process,	  and	  this	  is	  why	  understanding	  is	  not	  essentially	  about	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  meaning.	  The	  agreement	  is	  in	  the	  life,	  and	  the	  language	  is	  simply	  the	  presentation	  of	  the	  world	  through	  the	  word.	  Understanding	  language,	  then,	  comes	  down	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  language	  can	  do,	  in	  what	  ways	  language	  traverses	  the	  landscape;	  insofar	  as	  the	  form	  of	  life	  is	  shared,	  the	  meaning	  is	  understandable.	  Or,	  as	  
                                                76	  Saul	  Kripke,	  Wittgenstein	  on	  Rules	  and	  Private	  Language	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1982).	  77	  Rhees,	  “Wittgenstein’s	  Builders,”	  186.	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Goldfarb	  puts	  it,	  Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  a	  “mentalistic	  theory”	  of	  meaning:78	  	   [Wittgenstein’s]	  pointing	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  introspectible	  phenomena	  of	  the	  appropriate	  sorts	  is	  a	  way	  to	  show	  that	  an	  unwarranted	  step	  has	  been	  taken.	  In	  this	  step—rather	  than	  any	  specifically	  mentalistic	  theory—that	  wishes	  to	  undercut.	  To	  use	  his	  term	  of	  art,	  it	  is	  a	  question	  of	  the	  grammar	  of	  crucial	  notions	  like	  meaning.	  Given	  certain	  misunderstandings	  of	  that	  grammar,	  a	  naive	  philosopher	  might	  attempt	  a	  mentalistic	  account.	  But	  reactions	  to	  mentalism	  seek	  only	  to	  replace	  one	  explanans	  with	  another,	  and	  hence	  rely	  on	  the	  same	  presuppositions	  about	  the	  explanadum.79	  	  What	  it	  means	  for	  something	  to	  be	  meant,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  not	  at	  all	  like	  pointing	  to	  a	  fact	  as	  a	  reason	  why	  we	  have	  said	  such-­‐and-­‐such	  is	  the	  case.	  Rather,	  the	  meaning	  rests	  in	  how	  the	  language	  is	  employed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  its	  use.	  	   Wittgenstein’s	  private	  language	  argument,	  taken	  in	  the	  strong	  sense	  I	  have	  just	  argued	  for,	  changes	  our	  relationship	  with	  fact.	  For	  if	  the	  possibility	  of	  understanding	  is	  dependent	  on	  fitting	  whatever	  proposition	  within	  the	  linguistic	  context	  of	  a	  person’s	  sense	  of	  the	  world,	  then	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  truth-­‐determining	  fact	  of	  the	  world	  is	  diminished.	  Insofar	  as	  we	  consider	  our	  treatment	  of	  Ethics	  then,	  not	  only	  does	  traditional	  philosophy	  mistakenly	  suppose	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  a	  body	  of	  facts	  that	  can	  be	  scientifically	  understood,	  it	  also	  mistakenly	  takes	  the	  existence	  of	  facts	  to	  be	  the	  determiners	  of	  linguistic	  meaning.	  It	  is,	  however,	  the	  play	  of	  language	  within	  the	  linguistic	  scene	  that	  makes	  it	  publicly	  understandable	  and	  detachable	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  matter.	  	   Avoiding	  this	  double	  error	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  revision	  of	  Ethics.	  Instead	  of	  suggesting	  the	  the	  Good	  is	  something	  that	  we	  can	  sensically	  talk	  about,	  
                                                78	  Goldfarb,	  “I	  Want	  You	  to	  Bring	  Me	  a	  Slab,”	  280.	  79	  Ibid.	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Wittgenstein	  shows	  that	  Ethics	  is	  present	  in	  all	  of	  language,	  that	  the	  Good	  is	  “an	  attitude	  to	  the	  world	  and	  life.”80	  The	  Good	  is,	  in	  fact,	  precisely	  that	  liberation	  from	  philosophical	  doubt	  that	  Wittgenstein	  wants	  to	  promote.	  A	  concern	  for	  Ethics	  is	  therefore	  a	  concern	  for	  showing	  people	  how	  to	  live	  freely,	  how	  to	  live	  without	  the	  misunderstandings	  incurred	  by	  traditional	  philosophy.	  	  	   This	  conception	  of	  the	  Good	  as	  an	  attitude	  is	  a	  radical	  shift,	  and	  one	  that	  is	  all	  the	  more	  astounding	  given	  the	  time	  in	  which	  Wittgenstein	  wrote.	  It	  has	  much	  more	  the	  tone	  of	  the	  postmodern	  philosophers	  who	  would	  sweep	  in	  after	  Wittgenstein’s	  era	  and	  flip	  so	  many	  of	  the	  narratives	  of	  traditional	  philosophy.	  Of	  course,	  had	  they	  been	  able	  to	  see	  Wittgenstein	  the	  way	  I	  have	  been	  arguing	  we	  should	  read	  him,	  they	  would	  have	  known	  that	  he	  was	  hard	  at	  work	  in	  this	  effort	  for	  years	  already.	  The	  Good	  as	  an	  attitude	  that	  Wittgenstein	  thus	  implicitly	  conceives	  in	  his	  philosophy	  is	  one	  that	  inspires	  in	  us	  not	  a	  knowledge	  of	  absolute	  truth,	  but	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  ambivalence	  from	  which	  truth	  and	  falsity	  emerge.	  That	  is,	  this	  Good	  sees	  the	  ground	  for	  what	  it	  is,	  and	  understands	  that	  in	  traversing	  it,	  we	  will	  make	  meaning	  of	  it,	  but	  it	  will	  always	  be	  neutral	  ground.	  And,	  of	  course,	  the	  ground	  of	  which	  I	  speak	  is	  language	  itself,	  the	  word.	  	  	   This	  is	  a	  true	  deconstruction	  of	  traditional	  philosophy,	  and	  although	  Derrida	  does	  not	  make	  much	  use	  of	  Wittgenstein	  in	  his	  writing,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  latter’s	  influence	  in	  abundance.	  Derrida,	  a	  much	  more	  overtly	  political	  philosopher,	  tackled	  some	  of	  the	  same	  issues	  that	  Wittgenstein	  raised,	  only	  decades	  later	  and	  with	  a	  very	  different	  kind	  of	  flourish.	  As	  the	  father	  of	  deconstruction,	  though,	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  
                                                80	  Diamond,	  “Ethics,	  Imagination	  and	  Method,”	  153.	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Ethical	  attitude	  that	  must	  be	  adopted	  from	  this	  regard	  toward	  meaning	  will	  be	  very	  useful	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  politics	  embedded	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy.	  It	  is	  to	  Derrida,	  then,	  that	  we	  turn.	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Chapter	  4:	  Ambivalence	  and	  the	  Good	  By	  now,	  it	  will	  hopefully	  be	  clear	  to	  the	  reader	  that	  Wittgenstein’s	  method	  in	  the	  
Investigations	  is	  truly	  deconstructive	  in	  nature,	  and	  in	  this	  way	  anticipates	  the	  imaginative	  style	  of	  Derrida.	  Befitting	  of	  the	  name,	  the	  method	  of	  deconstruction	  is	  concerned	  with	  undoing	  the	  hierarchical	  structures	  upon	  which	  traditional	  philosophy	  is	  built,	  which,	  at	  least	  for	  Derrida,	  forced	  us	  into	  thinking	  that	  only	  the	  dominant,	  substantial	  entities	  were	  contributive	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  truth.	  Such	  a	  “truth,”	  Derrida	  might	  say,	  could	  only	  ever	  be	  a	  half-­‐truth	  at	  best,	  for	  although	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  principal	  element	  captured	  our	  attentions,	  they	  were	  delimited,	  perhaps	  even	  founded	  upon	  the	  supplemental.	  Derrida’s	  method,	  then,	  is	  one	  of	  revealing	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  accident,	  and	  consequently	  exposing	  the	  illusion	  of	  a	  true	  hierarchy.	  	  Wittgenstein,	  though	  employing	  quite	  a	  different	  vocabulary,	  was,	  in	  many	  ways,	  doing	  the	  same	  job.	  His	  Investigations	  are	  quite	  literally	  a	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Tractatus,	  insofar	  as	  they	  approach	  the	  same	  philosophical	  concepts	  through	  a	  long,	  non-­‐linear	  journey	  through	  life,	  rather	  than	  the	  more	  rigid,	  impersonal,	  seemingly	  upward	  movement	  of	  tradition.	  In	  the	  traditional,	  hierarchical	  picture	  of	  language,	  “the	  meaningfulness	  of	  language	  [is]	  founded	  on	  a	  direct	  and	  rather	  mysterious	  connection	  between	  names	  and	  things.”81	  With	  the	  same	  stroke	  that	  Wittgenstein	  eliminates	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  private	  language,	  in	  the	  Investigations	  he	  also	  collapses	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  world	  and	  the	  word.	  The	  philosophy	  of	  
                                                81	  Staten,	  Wittgenstein	  and	  Derrida,	  18.	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language	  as	  life,	  entailed	  by	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning	  as	  use,	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  Wittgenstein’s	  holism,	  and	  shifts	  our	  relationship	  with	  Ethics.	  From	  this	  perspective,	  we	  do	  not	  aim	  to	  know	  the	  Good,	  because	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  treat	  it	  as	  a	  fact	  that	  can	  be	  discovered.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  Good	  is	  something	  that	  is	  shown	  through	  language,	  from	  the	  inside.	  	  	   Derrida’s	  work,	  although	  it	  plays	  a	  rather	  different	  game,	  so	  to	  speak,	  will	  help	  us	  understand	  what	  this	  Ethics	  in	  deconstruction	  might	  be.	  What	  we	  have	  the	  occasion	  to	  learn	  from	  Derrida	  is	  precisely	  that	  the	  contextual	  difference	  that	  opens	  up	  a	  space	  for	  meaning	  is	  itself	  produced	  by	  the	  movement,	  the	  play,	  the	  deferral	  of	  language	  to	  itself.	  It	  is	  in	  order	  to	  capture	  the	  double	  productivity	  of	  language	  that	  Derrida	  coins	  the	  word	  différance.	  And	  it	  is	  the	  spirit	  of	  différance	  that	  Wittgenstein	  anticipated	  by	  showing—both	  in	  the	  form	  and	  content	  of	  the	  Investigations—that	  language	  is	  an	  activity,	  a	  form	  of	  life.	  To	  understand	  the	  political	  consequences	  of	  that	  spirit,	  we	  will	  now	  examine	  Derrida’s	  argument	  for	  deconstruction.	  	  Derrida’s	  deconstruction	  of	  traditional	  philosophy	  centers	  on	  what	  he	  calls	  logocentrism,	  the	  privileging	  of	  speech	  over	  the	  written	  word.	  In	  “Plato’s	  Pharmacy,”	  Derrida	  breaks	  open	  his	  critique	  of	  logocentrism,	  arguing	  that	  the	  hierarchical	  binaries	  that	  plague	  traditional	  philosophy—such	  as	  “good/evil,	  true/false,	  essence/appearance,	  inside/outside”	  and,	  we	  might	  add,	  speech/writing—can	  only	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  essential	  ambivalence	  of	  of	  their	  ground.82	  This	  ambivalence,	  Derrida	  argues,	  is	  precisely	  that	  of	  the	  word,	  which	  he	  characterizes	  as	  the	  
                                                82	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  “Plato’s	  Pharmacy,”	  in	  Dissemination,	  trans.	  Barbara	  Johnson	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1981),	  103.	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pharmakon,	  the	  Greek	  word	  for	  drug.	  This	  is	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  characterization	  of	  the	  word	  as	  a	  drug	  that	  we	  find	  in	  Plato’s	  Phaedrus,	  which	  depicts	  Socrates	  and	  Phaedrus	  debating	  over	  the	  nature	  of	  good	  speech.83	  Phaedrus	  at	  first	  seems	  to	  advocate	  the	  sophist	  argument	  that	  a	  good	  speech	  requires	  only	  rhetorical	  expertise,	  for	  its	  success	  depends	  only	  on	  whether	  it	  aligns	  with	  what	  the	  audience	  “might	  take	  to	  be	  right.”84	  Given	  that	  even	  Socrates	  would	  agree	  that	  any	  case	  can	  be	  argued	  from	  opposing	  sides,	  it	  would	  seem	  Phaedrus	  is	  right,	  and	  the	  most	  successful	  argument	  will	  be	  the	  one	  that	  most	  skillfully	  employs	  rhetorical	  expertise.	  However,	  Socrates	  insists	  that	  a	  good	  speech	  requires	  that	  “the	  mind	  of	  the	  speaker	  must	  know	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter	  to	  be	  addressed.”85	  This	  is	  because,	  he	  argues,	  merely	  knowing	  the	  tools	  of	  effective	  speech	  and	  what	  they	  can	  do	  is	  like	  knowing	  the	  drugs	  required	  for	  medical	  treatment,	  but	  remaining	  ignorant	  of	  to	  whom,	  when,	  and	  how	  they	  should	  be	  administered.	  Rhetorical	  expertise	  is	  only	  the	  preliminary	  to	  being	  a	  good	  speaker,	  just	  as	  pharmaceutical	  expertise	  is	  only	  the	  preliminary	  to	  being	  a	  doctor.	  To	  say	  otherwise	  would	  be	  not	  only	  mad,	  but	  dangerous.	  What,	  then,	  is	  required	  to	  elevate	  one	  from	  having	  mere	  book	  knowledge	  to	  actually	  skillful	  prowess?	  Socrates	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  knowledge	  of	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  being.	  “In	  both	  cases	  you	  have	  to	  determine	  the	  nature	  of	  something	  –	  the	  body	  in	  medicine	  and	  the	  soul	  in	  rhetoric	  –	  if	  you’re	  going	  to	  be	  an	  expert	  practitioner,	  
                                                83	  Plato,	  Phaedrus,	  trans.	  Robin	  Waterfield	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  84	  Ibid.,	  259e.	  85	  Ibid.,	  259e.	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rather	  than	  relying	  merely	  on	  an	  experimental	  knack.”86	  This	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  Plato’s	  critique	  of	  rhetoric.	  Knowing	  and	  using	  the	  tools	  of	  the	  trade	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  constitute	  good	  speech,	  because	  one	  must	  also	  be	  able	  to	  fit	  these	  tools	  to	  the	  type	  of	  
soul	  in	  question,	  just	  as	  a	  doctor	  must	  be	  able	  to	  fit	  the	  treatment	  to	  the	  particular	  of	  body	  under	  examination.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  same	  reason	  that	  Socrates	  denigrates	  the	  written	  word	  as	  the	  bastard	  child	  of	  the	  knowledgeable	  man.	  Disembodied	  from	  its	  author,	  writing	  catapults	  rhetoric	  at	  an	  unknown	  audience,	  but	  stands	  defenseless	  to	  retaliation.	  Once	  any	  account	  has	  been	  written	  down,	  you	  find	  it	  all	  over	  the	  place,	  hobnobbing	  with	  completely	  inappropriate	  people	  no	  less	  than	  with	  those	  who	  understand	  it,	  and	  completely	  failing	  to	  know	  who	  it	  should	  and	  shouldn’t	  talk	  to.	  And	  faced	  with	  rudeness	  and	  unfair	  abuse	  it	  always	  needs	  its	  father	  to	  come	  to	  its	  assistance,	  since	  it	  is	  incapable	  of	  defending	  or	  helping	  itself.87	  	  In	  short,	  the	  written	  word	  is	  the	  drug	  in	  isolation;	  it	  is	  the	  pharmakon,	  to	  use	  the	  Greek.	  Standing	  alone,	  it	  has	  no	  means	  of	  participating	  in	  the	  conversation	  that	  leads	  to	  education,	  because	  it	  sits	  inanimate,	  “[maintaining]	  an	  aloof	  silence”	  just	  like	  a	  painting.88	  	  Thus,	  while	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  good	  speech	  consists	  in	  knowledge	  of	  the	  truth	  and	  rhetorical	  expertise,	  the	  question	  of	  virtue	  is	  dissolved	  as	  it	  pertains	  to	  writing.	  Detached	  from	  the	  living	  author,	  the	  written	  word	  has	  no	  soul,	  and	  therefore	  falls	  short	  of	  such	  an	  evaluation.	  Listless	  and	  indifferent,	  writing	  can	  never	  truly	  be	  determined	  as	  good	  or	  bad.	  	  
                                                86	  Ibid.,	  270b.	  87	  Ibid.,	  275e.	  88	  Ibid.,	  275d.	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Derrida’s	  critique	  of	  this	  picture	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  a	  wholesale	  rejection	  of	  the	  dualist	  metaphysics.	  His	  point	  is	  not	  that	  such	  binaries	  do	  not	  exist.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  he	  plays	  within	  the	  logocentric	  system	  of	  oppositions	  to	  reveal	  that	  their	  condition	  of	  possibility	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  pharmakon,	  the	  written	  word.	  The	  crucial	  point	  is	  this:	  where	  Plato	  exiled	  writing	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  meaning	  and	  value,	  Derrida	  holds	  that	  the	  text,	  the	  pharmakon,	  is	  the	  necessary	  prior	  condition	  for	  any	  difference	  to	  exist.	  If	  the	  pharmakon	  is	  ‘ambivalent,’	  it	  is	  because	  it	  constitutes	  the	  medium	  in	  which	  opposites	  are	  opposed,	  the	  movement	  and	  the	  play	  that	  links	  them	  among	  themselves,	  reverses	  them	  or	  makes	  one	  side	  cross	  over	  into	  the	  other	  ...	  The	  pharmakon	  is	  the	  movement,	  the	  locus,	  and	  the	  play:	  (the	  production	  of)	  difference.89	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  Derrida	  is	  arguing	  that	  writing	  it	  itself	  the	  ground	  for	  meaningful,	  powerful	  language.	  Or,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  better	  to	  consider	  the	  logic	  by	  which	  writing	  operates.	  This	  logic	  is	  what	  Derrida	  calls	  différance,	  a	  term	  he	  coined	  to	  capture	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  word	  is	  the	  “production	  of	  differing/deferring.”90	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  word	  is	  in	  its	  difference	  from	  and	  deferral	  to	  other	  signs.	  It	  is,	  of	  course,	  easily	  recognized,	  even	  (or	  especially)	  from	  a	  logocentric	  perspective,	  that	  writing	  is	  this	  productive	  différance,	  given	  that	  it	  is	  the	  second-­‐order	  of	  signification;	  the	  written	  word	  is	  the	  signifier	  of	  the	  first	  sign,	  the	  spoken	  word.	  Derrida’s	  point	  is	  that	  all	  language,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  ostensively	  textual,	  operates	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  writing.	  And,	  returning	  for	  a	  moment	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  as	  we	  see	  language	  as	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immanent	  to	  human	  life,	  we	  might	  at	  last	  be	  able	  to	  understand	  Derrida	  when	  he	  says:	  “There	  is	  nothing	  outside	  of	  the	  text.”91	  	  Derrida,	  hailed	  as	  the	  father	  of	  deconstruction,	  is	  not	  (nor	  was	  he	  at	  the	  time	  the	  “Pharmacy”	  was	  published),	  the	  lone	  defender	  of	  this	  analysis	  of	  linguistic	  force.	  His	  argument	  was	  in	  many	  ways	  anticipated	  by	  I.A.	  Richards,	  who	  illustrated	  the	  detachment	  of	  the	  word	  from	  the	  present	  moment	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  its	  production	  of	  meaning.	  In	  his	  Philosophy	  of	  Rhetoric,	  Richards	  claims	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  “the	  missing	  parts	  of	  the	  contexts	  from	  which	  it	  draws	  its	  delegated	  efficacy.”92	  This	  highly	  technical	  definition	  depends	  on	  his	  particular	  use	  of	  the	  word	  context.	  He	  acknowledges	  that	  it	  shares	  some	  sense	  with	  the	  familiar	  literary	  context	  –	  whereby	  he	  derives	  the	  license	  to	  use	  the	  word	  –	  insofar	  as	  they	  both	  regard	  “the	  governing	  conditions	  of	  an	  interpretation.”93	  Richards’	  context	  is	  distinguished,	  however,	  by	  its	  referral	  to	  “the	  whole	  cluster	  of	  events	  that	  recur	  together,”94	  that	  is,	  to	  the	  simultaneous	  existence	  of	  the	  past	  and	  present.	  Richards	  thus	  seems	  to	  offer	  a	  kind	  of	  hyper-­‐fullness	  of	  the	  present,	  because	  it	  is	  saturated	  not	  only	  by	  its	  own	  events,	  the	  “required	  conditions,”	  but	  also	  those	  past,	  the	  “causes.”95	  	   However,	  we	  must	  remember	  that	  Richards	  is	  defining	  meaning	  as	  that	  which	  is	  missing	  from	  the	  context.	  The	  force	  of	  a	  word,	  its	  delegated	  efficacy,	  is	  said	  to	  come	  from	  something	  which	  is	  not	  present	  in	  the	  context.	  Richards	  argues	  that	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this	  missing	  thing,	  this	  absence,	  is	  the	  causal	  recurrence	  (i.e.	  the	  series	  of	  past	  events)	  for	  which	  a	  word	  stands.	  “In	  these	  contexts	  one	  item	  –	  typically	  a	  word	  –	  takes	  over	  the	  duties	  of	  parts	  which	  can	  then	  be	  omitted	  from	  the	  recurrence.”96	  The	  absence	  of	  the	  past	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  blatant	  contradiction	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  context	  Richards	  previously	  gave,	  which	  is	  the	  inclusion	  of	  the	  past	  in	  the	  present.	  But	  by	  tying	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  delegated	  efficacy	  to	  an	  act	  of	  sorting,	  Richards	  manages	  to	  escape	  the	  conflict.	  He	  argues	  that	  simplest	  form	  of	  thinking,	  perception,	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  a	  present	  stimulus	  being	  more	  or	  less	  similar	  to	  stimuli	  of	  the	  past.	  “Effects	  from	  more	  or	  less	  similar	  happenings	  in	  the	  past	  would	  come	  in	  to	  give	  our	  response	  its	  character	  and	  this	  as	  far	  as	  it	  went	  would	  be	  meaning.”97	  This	  process	  of	  sorting,	  then,	  is	  how	  the	  past	  is	  brought	  into	  the	  present	  to	  form	  the	  context.	  And	  it	  is	  by	  this	  sorting	  that	  the	  past	  event	  delegates	  or	  consigns	  its	  efficacy	  or	  power	  to	  the	  present.	  Thus,	  a	  present	  event	  is	  only	  a	  perception	  insofar	  as	  it	  bears	  the	  delegated	  efficacy	  of	  the	  past.	  Furthermore,	  in	  having	  consigned	  its	  power	  to	  the	  present,	  the	  past	  drops	  out	  of	  the	  perception.	  Or,	  to	  return	  to	  our	  interrogation	  of	  linguistic	  meaning,	  the	  word	  bearing	  the	  delegated	  efficacy	  of	  the	  perceived	  event,	  is	  thus	  able	  to	  do	  the	  work	  of	  the	  past	  events,	  which	  it	  renders	  essentially	  empty	  of	  content.	  As	  Richards	  says,	  the	  virtue	  of	  words	  is	  in	  that	  they	  are	  “substitutes	  exerting	  the	  powers	  of	  what	  is	  not	  there.”98	  	   This	  theory	  of	  linguistic	  meaning	  may	  at	  first	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  that	  developed	  by	  Derrida,	  whose	  argument	  entails	  the	  radical	  conclusion	  that	  words	  are	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above	  all	  not	  a	  substitute	  or	  representation	  of	  something.	  Although	  Derrida	  similarly	  relies	  on	  notions	  of	  context	  and	  absence,	  he	  aggressively	  rejects	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  its	  force	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  an	  idea	  or	  object	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  instead	  insists	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  meaning	  is	  primarily	  characterized	  by	  absence.	  It	  is	  vital	  to	  note	  here	  that	  Derrida’s	  use	  of	  context	  differs	  from	  Richards’,	  in	  that	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  strictly	  the	  context	  of	  events,	  but	  rather	  the	  context	  of	  producers	  and	  recipients	  of	  the	  word,	  those	  who	  mean	  and	  make	  meaning	  of	  words.	  Thus,	  the	  written	  word	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  tool	  for	  “extending	  enormously,	  if	  not	  infinitely,	  the	  domain	  of	  oral	  or	  gestural	  communication.”99	  That	  is,	  the	  written	  word	  expands	  the	  context	  of	  the	  author	  and	  addressee	  in	  their	  absence.	  We	  see	  then,	  that	  according	  to	  this	  alternate	  definition	  of	  context,	  the	  written	  word	  exists	  only	  in	  absentia	  of	  its	  context.	  It	  is	  this	  capacity	  for	  meaning	  in	  absence	  that	  Derrida	  means	  by	  the	  word’s	  
iterability.	  “In	  order	  to	  function,	  that	  is,	  to	  be	  readable,	  a	  signature	  [or	  any	  word]	  must	  have	  a	  repeatable,	  iterable,	  imitable	  form;	  it	  must	  be	  able	  to	  be	  detached	  from	  the	  present	  and	  singular	  intention	  of	  its	  production.”100	  Thus,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  must	  be	  not	  in	  its	  referral	  to	  something	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  there,	  as	  Richards	  apparently	  suggests,	  but	  in	  its	  actual	  emergence	  from	  the	  absence.	  	  	   But	  the	  conclusion	  that	  Richards	  draws	  is	  not	  simply	  that	  the	  world	  is	  a	  collection	  of	  things	  that	  are	  represented	  by	  words.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  he	  resolves	  that	  the	  content	  of	  the	  world	  is	  not	  determined	  by	  objects,	  but	  by	  the	  “instances	  of	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laws,”101	  or	  recurrences.	  Every	  experience,	  linguistic	  or	  not,	  is	  meaningful	  because	  of	  past	  iterations	  of	  that	  experience,	  which	  the	  present	  moment	  now	  cites.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  disagreement	  between	  him	  and	  Derrida	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  wholly	  intractable;	  in	  fact,	  a	  distinct	  congruence	  of	  their	  arguments	  becomes	  visible.	  Framing	  the	  recurrence	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  law	  reveals,	  in	  very	  Derridian	  terms,	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  event	  in	  question	  is	  not	  its	  referral	  or	  object	  of	  substitution,	  but	  its	  necessary	  potential	  existence.	  A	  law	  exists	  only	  in	  the	  “general	  space	  of	  [the]	  possibility”	  to	  do	  otherwise,102	  and	  thus,	  meaning	  and	  the	  world	  only	  exist	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  their	  absence.	  Using	  Richards	  to	  illuminate	  Derrida,	  then,	  if	  we	  trace	  the	  historical	  iterations	  of	  a	  word	  we	  can	  expose	  the	  moments	  of	  its	  potential	  subversion.	  What,	  then,	  are	  the	  implications	  for	  Derrida’s	  deconstruction	  of	  Plato’s	  classical	  metaphysical	  picture	  of	  language?	  What	  does	  it	  mean	  for	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  to	  be,	  at	  its	  very	  core,	  emergent	  from	  a	  necessary	  absence?	  It	  would	  perhaps	  suggest	  that	  all	  evaluation	  is	  arbitrary,	  that	  the	  sophists	  were	  right	  and	  the	  division	  between	  good	  and	  evil	  (and	  all	  other	  binaries)	  is	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  playing	  to	  the	  audience.	  Derrida,	  however,	  refuses	  to	  align	  himself	  with	  this	  position.	  Instead,	  he	  provides	  the	  metaphysical	  structure	  required	  to	  explain	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  thing	  must	  come	  from	  its	  possible	  non-­‐meaning.	  The	  vitality	  of	  speech,	  of	  the	  good,	  comes	  from	  its	  possibility	  of	  being	  listless,	  of	  being	  bad	  writing.	  And	  this	  necessary	  possibility	  is	  the	  playground	  of	  the	  pharmakon,	  the	  space	  of	  absence.	  Understanding	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this	  picture	  does	  not	  result	  in	  the	  absolute	  destruction	  of	  the	  apparent	  binaries	  of	  our	  natural	  world.	  It	  instead	  enlightens	  us	  as	  to	  their	  source,	  revealing	  that	  they	  are	  not	  the	  facts	  of	  reality.	  They	  are	  the	  consequence	  of	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  the	  
pharmakon.	  But	  this	  does	  not	  yet	  address	  the	  political	  ramifications	  of	  taking	  this	  philosophy	  of	  language	  seriously.	  While	  it	  was	  Richards’	  hope	  that	  recognizing	  the	  delegated	  efficacy	  of	  words	  could	  facilitate	  their	  transformation	  from	  “swords	  of	  dispute…into	  plough	  shares,”103	  the	  actual	  consequences	  of	  the	  word	  as	  pharmakon	  are	  not	  so	  easily	  settled.	  As	  Judith	  Butler	  notes	  in	  Excitable	  Speech,	  the	  citationality	  of	  speech	  tempts	  us	  to	  doubt	  whether	  an	  individual	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  their	  utterance.104	  For,	  the	  essential	  ambivalence	  of	  a	  word	  indicates	  that	  “speech	  is	  always	  in	  some	  ways	  out	  of	  our	  control”.105	  We	  are	  therefore	  led	  to	  ask:	  “Can	  one	  say	  that	  someone	  else	  made	  up	  this	  speech	  that	  one	  simply	  finds	  oneself	  using	  and	  thereby	  absolve	  oneself	  of	  all	  responsibility?”106	  Are	  we	  ultimately	  unjustified	  in	  holding	  anyone	  accountable,	  as	  we	  do	  through	  hate	  speech	  regulation,	  for	  their	  speech?	  Following	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  is	  fraught	  with	  danger,	  especially	  if	  we	  consider	  its	  implications	  for	  hate	  speech;	  it	  would	  be	  a	  great	  disservice	  to	  those	  derogated	  by	  hate	  speech	  if	  we	  concluded	  that	  speakers	  could	  never	  be	  culpable.	  This	  is	  the	  objection	  raised	  by	  Jeremy	  Waldron,	  in	  his	  book,	  The	  Harm	  in	  Hate	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Speech.107	  He	  argues	  against	  the	  liberal	  prioritization	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment	  over	  the	  rights	  of	  all	  to	  a	  sense	  of	  inclusive	  security	  and	  to	  dignity.	  Staunch	  defenders	  of	  the	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  Waldron	  says,	  endorse	  the	  argument	  that	  “people	  who	  are	  targeted	  [by	  hate	  speech]	  should	  just	  learn	  to	  live	  with	  it.”108	  But	  this	  is	  the	  willful	  inhabitation	  of	  a	  poisonous	  environment,	  one	  in	  which	  discrimination,	  violence,	  and	  exclusion	  are	  allowed	  to	  seep	  into	  society	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  liberty.	  It	  is	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  society	  that	  denies	  the	  “fundamentals	  of	  justice:	  that	  all	  are	  equally	  human,	  and	  have	  the	  dignity	  of	  humanity,	  that	  all	  have	  an	  elementary	  entitlement	  to	  justice,	  and	  that	  all	  deserve	  protection	  from	  the	  most	  egregious	  forms	  of	  violence,	  exclusion,	  indignity,	  and	  subordination.”109	  Insofar	  as	  a	  democratic	  republic	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  is	  concerned	  with	  defending	  this	  fundamental	  justice,	  hate	  speech	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  “attack	  on	  public	  order”	  and	  thus	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  state.	  110	  However,	  Butler,	  whose	  argument	  echoes	  the	  logic	  of	  Derrida	  and	  Richards,	  claims	  that	  hate	  speech	  regulation,	  rather	  than	  eliminating	  injurious	  words	  from	  our	  language,	  “will	  also	  reiterate	  and	  restage	  those	  slurs,	  reproduce	  them	  this	  time	  as	  state-­‐sanctioned	  speech.”111	  Put	  differently,	  by	  identifying	  certain	  words	  as	  being	  unspeakable,	  “the	  state	  produces	  hate	  speech.”112	  It	  creates	  a	  category	  of	  words	  that	  are	  supposed	  not	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  anything	  except	  injury	  and	  derogation.	  Yet,	  the	  production	  of	  hate	  speech	  is	  paradoxical,	  for	  as	  it	  ascribes	  the	  singular	  meaning	  of	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these	  words,	  it	  uses	  them,	  it	  cites	  them,	  it	  iterates	  them	  without	  injuring	  or	  derogating.	  In	  outlawing	  hate	  speech	  because	  of	  its	  supposed	  absolutely	  harmful	  effects,	  regulations	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  necessary	  possibility	  that	  these	  words	  could	  fail	  to	  harm.	  Thus,	  in	  regulating	  hate	  speech,	  the	  state	  simultaneously	  demarcates	  and	  violates	  the	  line	  between	  acceptable	  and	  unacceptable	  speech,	  calling	  into	  question	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  such	  a	  boundary.	  	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  Butler’s	  aim	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  that	  words	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  do	  harm.	  Like	  Waldron,	  she	  in	  fact	  figures	  the	  violence	  of	  an	  insult	  –	  hate	  speech	  being	  the	  ultimate	  insult	  –	  as	  its	  exclusion	  of	  the	  subject	  from	  society.	  “Exposed	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  such	  a	  shattering	  is	  precisely	  the	  volatility	  of	  one’s	  ‘place’	  within	  the	  community	  of	  speakers;	  one	  can	  be	  ‘put	  in	  one’s	  place’	  by	  such	  speech,	  but	  such	  a	  place	  may	  be	  no	  place.”113	  Her	  point	  here	  is	  that	  the	  power	  of	  a	  word	  to	  injure	  lies	  in	  its	  concurrent	  and	  indispensable	  power	  not	  to	  injure.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  insult	  may	  veritably	  be	  a	  poison	  as	  Waldron	  notes,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  its	  own	  remedy.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  an	  altogether	  surprising	  conclusion.	  The	  reappropriation	  of	  invective	  may	  well	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  progression	  of	  meaning	  in	  the	  lifecycle	  of	  a	  word.	  If	  we	  look	  at	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  word	  queer	  for	  example,	  we	  can	  see	  clearly	  its	  transformation	  from	  a	  relatively	  neutral	  word	  synonymous	  to	  
odd,	  to	  a	  slanderous	  epithet	  hurled	  at	  those	  perceived	  to	  be	  gay,	  and	  then	  to	  a	  defiant	  claim	  of	  identity	  by	  those	  it	  was	  once	  meant	  to	  victimize.	  Just	  as	  any	  other	  vitriolic	  phrase,	  queer	  has	  undoubtedly	  been	  used	  to	  subordinate	  individuals	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belonging	  or	  presumed	  to	  belong	  to	  certain	  groups.	  It	  is	  therefore	  not	  unlike	  any	  other	  word	  in	  its	  multiplicity	  of	  potential	  meaning;	  it	  is	  not	  invulnerable	  to	  being	  transformed.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  it	  is	  this	  very	  vulnerability	  that	  makes	  possible	  the	  self-­‐empowerment	  of	  oppressed	  groups.	  	  	   The	  abrogation	  of	  hate	  speech	  is	  therefore	  doubly	  paradoxical.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  engage	  the	  non-­‐injurious	  use	  of	  a	  word	  that	  it	  purports	  to	  be	  impossible,	  it	  also	  impedes	  a	  means	  of	  reclaiming	  one’s	  dignity,	  the	  very	  dignity	  that	  hate	  speech	  regulation	  is	  supposed	  to	  guarantee.	  	  	  The	  question,	  then,	  is	  why,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  this	  deep	  paradox,	  are	  we	  “tempted”	  to	  hold	  a	  speaker	  responsible	  for	  the	  injury	  inflicted	  by	  speech.114	  Butler	  argues	  this	  desire	  indicates	  our	  nostalgia	  for	  a	  sovereign	  speaker,	  whose	  speech	  was	  unfailingly	  efficacious,	  and	  who	  could,	  as	  such,	  be	  understood	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  state	  of	  affairs.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐secular	  era,	  that	  speaker	  was	  God,	  whose	  divinity	  ensured	  that	  His	  Word	  was	  true,	  and	  moreover,	  that	  his	  His	  Word	  was	  done;	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  God	  guaranteed	  the	  efficacy	  of	  His	  Word.	  Thus,	  Luther	  preached	  that	  faith	  did	  not	  require	  any	  puzzlement	  over	  the	  miracle	  of	  God’s	  flesh	  being	  the	  bread.	  “Christ,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  does	  all	  these	  things	  through	  the	  Word,	  just	  as	  the	  wonders	  which	  he	  daily	  performs	  are	  countless.	  Should	  he	  not	  through	  the	  same	  power	  know	  how	  to	  do	  these	  things	  also	  here	  in	  the	  sacrament?	  He	  has	  put	  himself	  into	  the	  Word,	  and	  through	  the	  Word	  he	  puts	  himself	  into	  the	  bread	  also.”115	  God’s	  Word,	  as	  sovereign	  speech,	  is	  absolutely	  efficacious.	  
                                                114	  Ibid.,	  preface,	  27.	  115	  Martin	  Luther,	  “The	  Sacrament	  of	  the	  Body	  and	  Blood	  of	  Christ	  –	  Against	  the	  Fanatics,”	  in	  Word	  
and	  Sacrament,	  trans.	  Frederick	  C.	  Ahrens	  (Philadelphia:	  Muhlenberg	  Press,	  1959)	  343.	  
 	  
68	  
In	  the	  secular	  era,	  however,	  the	  “sovereign	  organization	  of	  power	  [is	  lost]”	  such	  that	  there	  is	  no	  “single	  subject”	  who	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  the	  originator	  of	  performative	  speech;	  power	  becomes	  diffuse,	  “emanating	  from	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  sites.”116	  And	  yet,	  insofar	  as	  a	  derogatory	  word	  is	  able	  to	  effect	  real	  harm,	  insofar	  as	  “it	  does	  what	  it	  says	  and	  it	  does	  what	  it	  says	  it	  will	  do	  to	  the	  one	  addressed	  by	  the	  speech,”117	  it	  continues	  to	  be	  figured	  as	  sovereign	  speech.	  Thus,	  the	  contemporary	  political	  climate	  permits	  a	  sovereign	  speech	  without	  a	  sovereign	  subject,	  and	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  “compensate	  for	  the	  [resulting]	  difficulties	  and	  anxieties”	  by	  paradoxically	  attributing	  responsibility	  to	  the	  speaker.118	  	  It	  should	  be	  clear,	  however,	  that	  this	  treatment	  cannot	  be	  successful	  in	  alleviating	  the	  tension	  between	  acknowledging	  the	  efficacy	  of	  some	  speech	  and	  maintaining	  the	  diffusion	  of	  power.	  It	  cannot	  be	  ethically	  advantageous	  to	  demarcate	  certain	  words	  as	  hate	  speech,	  because	  it	  requires	  a	  phantasmatic	  resurrection	  of	  a	  sovereign	  power	  that	  stands	  antithetical	  to	  the	  contemporary	  configuration	  of	  subjectivity.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  word	  as	  pharmakon,	  as	  insubordinate	  to	  the	  laws	  that	  a	  sovereign	  power	  is	  supposed	  to	  dictate.	  	  Admitting	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  hate	  speech	  is	  paradoxical,	  however,	  does	  little	  to	  address	  the	  unease	  that	  provokes	  its	  regulation.	  We	  want	  to	  avoid	  the	  objection	  that	  accepting	  the	  citationality	  of	  the	  word	  is	  to	  drink	  the	  poison.	  However,	  following	  the	  logic	  I	  have	  here	  tried	  to	  explicate,	  we	  should	  immediately	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recognize	  the	  error	  in	  presuming	  that	  the	  toxicity	  of	  a	  word	  will	  always	  remain	  as	  potent.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  to	  forget	  that,	  while	  citationality	  admits	  that	  the	  word	  may	  do	  harm,	  it	  also	  permits	  the	  word	  to	  be	  transformed	  to	  do	  good.	  The	  question,	  therefore,	  is	  not	  What	  words	  should	  be	  banned	  so	  that	  they	  cannot	  harm	  me?	  but	  rather,	  How	  can	  I	  understand	  the	  power	  of	  words	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  devalue	  me?	  The	  reformulation	  of	  this	  ethical	  question	  regarding	  words	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  intended	  to	  deny	  that	  words	  can	  concretely	  affect	  a	  person.	  It	  offers,	  instead,	  a	  means	  of	  developing	  an	  ethics	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  word	  as	  pharmakon	  and	  is	  consequently	  in	  a	  position	  to	  see	  the	  pharmakon	  as	  a	  potential	  catalyst	  for	  change.	  What	  does	  this	  new	  ethics	  look	  like?	  And	  more	  specifically,	  what	  is	  it	  to	  be	  
good	  in	  this	  new	  ethics?	  If	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  power	  of	  words	  is	  an	  understanding	  of	  them	  as	  prior	  to	  value,	  then	  where	  is	  the	  good	  located?	  It	  is	  found	  in	  our	  selves,	  and	  moreover,	  in	  the	  relation	  of	  our	  selves	  to	  the	  word.	  To	  be	  good,	  according	  to	  this	  new	  ethic,	  is	  to	  open	  oneself	  up	  to	  the	  pharmakon.	  It	  is	  to	  admit	  the	  same	  vulnerability	  in	  one’s	  own	  constitution	  as	  that	  which	  structures	  the	  power	  of	  words.	  In	  so	  doing,	  one	  may	  indeed	  feel	  the	  pain	  of	  an	  insult.	  For	  while	  we	  have	  pointed	  to	  a	  central	  paradox	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  hate	  speech	  as	  a	  governable	  object,	  we	  still	  cannot	  deny	  that	  some	  speech	  is	  cruel,	  unjust,	  and	  violent.	  But	  this	  malice	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  very	  same	  word	  could	  heal,	  redeem,	  and	  pacify.	  When	  the	  state	  is	  allotted	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  hate	  speech,	  we	  are	  trapped	  in	  the	  brutality	  of	  the	  word.	  Exposing	  ourselves	  to	  the	  pharmakon	  may,	  by	  contrast,	  reveal	  to	  us	  the	  dynamism	  of	  our	  own	  position,	  without	  which	  we	  can	  have	  no	  hope	  of	  changing	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  word.	  It	  is	  better,	  then,	  to	  stand	  waiting	  for	  this	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revelation	  than	  to	  preclude	  its	  possibility.	  This	  is	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  Good	  that	  Wittgenstein	  was	  pointing	  to.	  This	  openness	  to	  the	  world	  is	  what	  allows	  the	  Good	  to	  be	  shown	  in	  language.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  a	  life	  will	  be	  without	  conflict,	  without	  pain,	  even.	  The	  terrain	  is	  rough,	  and	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  trip	  over	  on	  more	  than	  one	  occasion.	  It	  is	  also	  filled	  with	  other	  people,	  who	  come	  from	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  other	  places,	  and	  who	  might	  say	  something	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  hurting	  us.	  However,	  the	  hope	  of	  protecting	  ourselves	  from	  these	  assaults	  by	  restricting	  what	  people	  can	  say,	  which	  is	  to	  restrict	  how	  they	  can	  move	  in	  the	  world,	  will	  be	  unsuccessful	  and	  ultimately	  detrimental	  to	  the	  cause.	  Though	  the	  aim	  is	  to	  encourage	  people	  to	  use	  Good	  speech,	  the	  impulse	  to	  censor	  is	  founded	  on	  a	  basic	  misunderstanding	  of	  how	  meaning	  operates	  in	  language.	  The	  word	  itself	  cannot	  be	  regulated,	  because	  the	  word	  is	  essentially	  ambivalent.	  It	  is	  this	  ambivalence	  that	  provides	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  meaning	  anything	  with	  words,	  Good	  or	  Evil.	  To	  censor	  the	  word	  is	  to	  inadvertently	  ascribe	  to	  the	  word	  only	  one	  possible	  meaning,	  trapping	  it	  in	  a	  cage	  that	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  contain	  it.	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Conclusion	  	  Wittgenstein	  contributed	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  the	  philosophy	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  and	  his	  influence	  lingers	  on	  even	  today.	  He	  wrote	  with	  unique	  style,	  which	  sometimes	  obscured	  the	  ideas	  that	  I	  think	  he	  was	  trying	  to	  communicate.	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  have	  done	  with	  this	  essay	  is	  show	  that	  the	  philosophy	  of	  language	  that	  he	  put	  forth	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  lifetime,	  and	  especially	  the	  theory	  of	  meaning	  that	  it	  was	  founded	  on,	  was	  Wittgenstein's	  attempt	  to	  develop	  a	  philosophy	  that	  truly	  was	  therapeutic.	  His	  aim	  was	  to	  redirect	  our	  attentions	  from	  the	  confused	  and	  impossible	  questions	  of	  traditional	  philosophy,	  ones	  that	  made	  use	  imagine	  ourselves	  to	  be	  trapped	  in	  a	  desperate	  and	  hopeless	  situation	  of	  uncertainty.	  By	  reorienting	  us	  to	  the	  world,	  however,	  Wittgenstein	  shows	  us	  that	  the	  dilemmas	  and	  misunderstandings	  are	  of	  our	  own	  making,	  and	  that	  all	  we	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  move	  freely	  through	  the	  world	  is	  the	  recognition	  that	  we	  are	  certainly	  able	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Finding	  our	  footing	  involves	  realizing	  that	  linguistic	  meaning	  does	  not	  exist	  on	  some	  ideal,	  metaphysical	  plane,	  only	  to	  be	  brought	  down	  to	  our	  level	  through	  the	  word.	  It	  is,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  the	  word	  that	  word	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  linguistic	  ground,	  with	  meaning	  emerging	  from	  our	  movement	  through	  the	  terrain,	  through	  the	  scenes	  of	  language.	  But	  for	  the	  word	  to	  be	  figured	  as	  such	  is	  to	  recognize	  it	  as	  the	  
pharmakon	  of	  which	  Derrida	  spoke,	  that	  necessary	  ambivalence	  from	  which	  value	  can	  be	  decided.	  In	  this	  light,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  word	  cannot	  be	  governed,	  it	  cannot	  be	  restrained	  by	  law,	  without	  presuming	  a	  contradictory	  understanding	  of	  how	  meaning	  operates	  in	  language.	  This	  assumption	  leads	  us	  to	  task	  ourselves	  with	  the	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